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DEBTORS' EXEMPTION RIGHTS UNDER THE
BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT
WILLIAM T. VUKOWICHt
Section 522 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19781 provides debt-
ors with valuable exemption rights. Generally, debtors are entitled to
the exemptions granted by the states of their residence2 and by federal,
nonbankruptcy laws. Alternatively, debtors may select exemptions
from a list of property contained in subsection 522(d),4 unless the law
of their states specifically denies them this alternative.5 This rather
convoluted scheme was the product of a compromise between members
of the House and Senate, which will be discussed more fully below.6
Section 522, together with the new Act's discharge provision,7 is
central to the congressional scheme of providing debtors with a "fresh
start."8 Permitting debtors to retain part of their assets while relieving
them of all or most of their debts puts them on the road to a new
financial future without the necessity of assistance from the state, chari-
ties or friends. A direct byproduct of this debtor rehabilitation, how-
ever, is that creditors suffer. To the extent that debtors' assets are
exempt, the assets are not available for liquidation and the payment of
dividends to creditors.9 Debts owed these creditors are therefore rele-
t Professor of Law, Georgetown University. A.B. 1965, Indiana University; J.D. 1968,
University of California, Berkeley; J.S.D. 1976, Columbia University. I wish to thank my col-
league, John Steadman, for his many helpful comments regarding an earlier draft of this article.
1. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522 (West 1979).
2. See text accompanying note 62 infra.
3. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b)(2)(A) (West 1979).
4. Id. § 522(b)(1).
5. Id.
6. See text accompanying notes 39-45 infra.
7. 11 U.S.C.A. § 727 (West 1979).
8. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BANKRUPTCY LAW REVISION, H.R. REP. No. 595,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 125, 128, 176, 366 (1977), reprinted in [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
5963 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]; SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BANKRUPTCY
REFORM ACT of 1978, S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 76, 8! (1978), reprinted in [19781
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]; see REPORT OF THE
COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. 137, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 1, 169-70 (1973) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT].
9. Often, in fact, creditors have little interest in the debtor's estate because it contains so few
assets. Therefore, the beneficiary of a denial of exemptions is frequently the trustee. See Bank-
ruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on HR. 31 & 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil & Constitutional
Rights ofthe House Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt . 2, 767, 773, 786-88
(1975-1976) (statement of Professor Shuchman) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
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gated to bad debt tax deductions. No doubt the exemption laws con-
tribute significantly to the high percentage of cases in which no assets at
all are available for distribution to creditors.' 0 Congress seemed un-
concerned with this consideration, however, because it did not consider
seriously a bankruptcy scheme that would guarantee some minimal
dividend to creditors as a condition to debtors receiving a "fresh
start." '
Another general defect of exemption laws is that they tend to per-
petuate our economic class structure. Those who have are allowed to
keep; those who do not have are given nothing. This class perpetuation
is most vivid when courts' 2 and commentators 3 urge an application of
the exemption laws that allows a debtor to "maintain a standard of
living reasonably consistent with his occupation and previous his-
tory."'14 Congress' inclusion of debtors' interests in spendthrift trusts as
property that the debtors may retain 5 also illustrates how the law tends
to perpetuate economic class structure. Given the legal recognition of
spendthrift trusts over the years and the reliance of many settlors of on
these trusts in disposing of their property, Congress felt constrained not
to upset that reliance, 16 even though many good policies argue against
the continued recognition of spendthrift trusts. The result is an unjusti-
fied, albeit explicable, perpetuation of classes.
Notwithstanding these untoward effects of exemption laws, they
are defensible because the only alternative-some form of welfare for
debtors and their families' 7 -is not reasonable. To allow creditors to
reach all of a debtor's assets in bankruptcy would compel the debtor's
reliance on welfare programs to provide immediate necessities and fu-
ture support until the debtor was able to get back on his feet. Exemp-
10. See generally D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESs, REFORM 20-
24 (1971); House Hearings, supra note 9, at 768-69 (statement of Professor Shuchman).
11. Previous bankruptcy acts have conditioned allowances of property to the debtor, see
Bankruptcy Act of 1800 ch. 19, § 34, 2 Stat. 19, and the discharge of debts, see Bankruptcy Act of
1867 ch. 176, § 33, 14 Stat. 517, as amended by ch. 258, 15 Stat. 226 (1868), upon the debtor's assets
being sufficient to pay 50% of debts owed.
12. See, e.g., Newport Nat'l Bank v. Adair, 2 Cal. App. 3d 1043, 1046, 83 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3
(1969); Independence Bank v. Heller, 275 Cal. App. 2d 84, 87-88, 90, 79 Cal. Rptr. 868, 871, 872
(1969).
13. E.g., D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 10, at 206.
14. Id.
15. See text accompanying notes 71-75 infra.
16. "The bankruptcy of the beneficiary [of a spendthrift trust] should not be permitted to
defeat the legitimate expectations of the settlor of the trust." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8 at 176.
17. See Weistart, The Costs ofBankrupcy, 41:4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., 107, 119-22; Com-
ment, 68 YALE LJ. 1459, 1497-502 (1959).
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tion laws allow for a speedier rehabilitation of debtors. Furthermore,
exemption laws reduce the likelihood that insolvents will remain on the
welfare rolls for a long, possibly indefinite, period of time.
Transferring the costs of debtor rehabilitation from welfare-that
is, the state-generally is not unfair to creditors. They have extended
credit' 8 aware of their debtors' financial situations and the exemption
laws. In addition, losses caused by the exemption laws generally can' 9
be passed on to society through higher costs for goods and services.
That a debtor who has substantial assets and is insolvent fares
much better in the bankruptcy process due to the exemption laws than
does a debtor who is on welfare and insolvent may seem unfair.
Changing from an exemption system to a welfare system might remove
this particular unfairness, but it would certainly not improve the lot of
the debtors who are on welfare. Hence, while the unfairness might be
obviated, nobody would gain by such a change and many-including
society generally-would lose.
As a consequence, the class perpetuation effect of the exemption
laws appears to be something we should resolve to accept notwith-
standing its inequity. To say, however, that exemption laws are accept-
able in principle is only a first step. Stating what the exemption laws
should provide in detail is a more difficult task. As a guideline, exemp-
tions should not exceed what is necessary for the support of debtors
and their dependents and for debtors' rehabilitation. To grant greater
exemptions would provide a windfall to debtors while denying credi-
tors payments to which they are entitled. The reader should keep this
general principle in mind throughout the following discussion.
The purpose of this Article is to provide a detailed analysis of the
exemption provisions of the new Bankruptcy Code. The logical place
to begin such an analysis, of course, is the legislative history of section
522. The first part of this Article will be devoted to that topic. In the
second section of the Article, the nuts and bolts of section 522 will be
explained, with a special emphasis on the ambiguities of the present
statutory language. The final section of the Article offers a theoretical
critique of section 522.
18. This does not apply to tort judgment creditors who have had no opportunity to evaluate
their debtors' creditworthiness. I have elsewhere recommended that tort judgment creditors'
claims be exceptions to the exemption laws for this reason. See Vukowich, The Bankruptcy Com-
mission'r Proposals Regarding Bankrupts' Exemption Rights, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1439, 1474-77
(1975).
19. This is not true of tort judgment creditors and small contract creditors.
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I. HISTORY OF SECTION 522
The predecessor of section 522 was section 6 of the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898.20 Section 6 granted bankrupts the exemptions provided by
federal nonbankruptcy laws and state laws.2' Section 6's policy of de-
ferring to the manifold state exemption laws was criticized severely,22
although it had a few defenders.23 Critics of section 6 correctly noted
that bankrupts from different states were treated unequally because of
the states' vastly different exemption laws.2 4 To aggravate this inequal-
ity, most states have failed to keep their exemption laws contempo-
rary.25 Consequently, dollar limitations on exempt property
established years ago have been rendered unrealistic by the passage of
time and the pressures of inflation. For example, North Carolina's
$1,000 homestead exemption provided meaningful debtor protection in
1868 when it was enacted;26 however, that same $1,000 homestead ex-
emption is insignificant if not meaningless today.27 On the other hand,
a one-half acre urban homestead may have been reasonable in 1868
when land was plentiful and settlers were needed.28 Today, however, it
seems clearly exorbitant.29 Thus, for various reasons, state exemption
20. Bankruptcy Act § 6, I1 U.S.C. § 24 (1976) (repealed 1978).
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., S. ENZER, R. DEBRIGARD & F. LAZAR, SOME CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING
BANKRUPTCY REFORM 194-95, 212-13 (1973); Countryman, For a New Exemption Policy in Bank.
ruptcy, 14 RUTGERS L. REv. 678 (1960); King, Proposed Amendments to the Chandler Act, 45
COM. L.J. 36, 40 (1940); Vukowich, supra note 18, at 1441-46; Comment, supra note 17.
23. See Kennedy, Limitation of Exemptions in Bankruptcy, 45 IowA L. REV. 445, 446-53
(1960); Plumb, The Recommendations of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws - Exempt and
Immune Property, 61 VA. L. REv. 1, 152 (1975). Presumably, Professor Kennedy has changed his
views. See House Hearings, supra note 9, pt. I, at 169-70 (statement of Professor Kennedy).
24. See authorities cited note 22 supra.
25. See, e-g., Joslin, Debtors' Exemption Laws: Time/or Modernization, 34 IND. L.J. 355
(1959); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 126.
26. Law of April 8, 1869, ch. 137, §§ 7, 8, 1868 N.C. Sess. Laws 331 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-386 (Cum. Supp. 1979)); see N.C. CONST. art. X, § 2.
27. In Seeman Printery, Inc. v. Schinhan, 34 N.C. App. 637, 239 S.E.2d 744 (1977), appeal
dismissed, 294 N.C. 442, 244 S.E.2d 844 (1978), a debtor challenged the state general assembly's
failure to increase the state's homestead exemption. The $1,000 homestead is established as a
minimum in the state constitution, but the general assembly has never increased the amount. The
debtor introduced evidence of an economic historian that the $1,000 amount established by the
state constitution in 1868 would equal $170,000 in 1976. The court conceded that the purpose of
the homestead exemption "certainly cannot be attained so long as the value of the exemption is
limited to $1,000," id. at 641, 239 S.E.2d at 747, but refused to grant the debtor any relief.
28. See Fla. CONST. art. 10, § 4(a)(l); IOWA CODE ANN. § 561.2 (1950); Wall, Homestead and
the Process of History: The Proposed Changes in Article X, Section 4, 6 FLA. St. U.L. REv. 878,
897-99 (1978).
29. Maines & Maines, Our Legal Chameleon Revisited: Florida's Homestead Exempllon, 30
U. FLA. L. REv. 227, 252-53 & n.180 (1978); see O'Brien v. Johnson, 275 Minn. 305, 309-11, 148
N.W.2d 357, 360-61 (1967).
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laws varied widely and resulted in disparate treatment of bankrupts.
When the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was amended in 1938 by the
Chandler Act,30 section 6 was amended in minor ways, 31 but the policy
of deferring to state exemption laws remained intact. Shortly thereaf-
ter, Lawrence King, Chairman of the National Bankruptcy Conference,
remarked, "[T]here is no one thing which makes our uniform Bank-
ruptcy Act more un-uniform than Section 6 ... which recognizes state
laws in the setting aside of exemptions."32
Prompted by these and other33 criticisms of section 6, the Commis-
sion on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States proposed a system of
uniform bankruptcy exemptions that would be the exclusive exemption
law in bankruptcy.34 The Commisssion's proposed law generally fol-
lowed the various state laws concerning the type of property to be ex-
empt, and struck a balance between the more generous and the more
niggardly state dollar limitations on the amount of the exemptions.35
Shortly after the Commission's proposal was announced, the National
Conference of Bankruptcy Judges came forward with its own propo-
sal.36 The Judges' proposal would have given bankrupts a choice be-
tween the exemptions under state and federal nonbankruptcy law and a
list of exempt property that closely paralleled the Commission's propo-
sal. Both the Commission's37 and the Judges' 38 proposals were submit-
ted as bills in the Ninety-Fourth Congress in 1975.
The various experts and representatives of interest groups who tes-
tified at congressional hearings on bankruptcy reform generally fa-
vored abandoning section 6's policy. 39 They differed, however, on
30. Pub. L. No. 696, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11
U.S.C. (1976) (repealed 1978)).
31. See IA COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 6.02 (14th ed. 1975).
32. King, supra note 23 at 40.
33. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 170-71.
34. Id; see H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 4-503 (1975), reprinted in House Hearings, supra
note 9, app. I, at 146-51.
35. See Plumb, supra note 22, at 15-17, 18-20, 27-29, 33-35, 40-42, 47-52, 69-72; Vukowich,
supra note 18, at 1460-67.
36. See H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 4-503 (1975), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note
9, app. I, at 146-51.
37. H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 4-503 (1975), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 9,
app. I at 146-51.
38. H.R. 32, 94th Cong., Ist Sess., § 4-503 (1975), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 9,
app. I, at 146-51.
39. See, e.g., House Hearings supra note 9, at 937 (statement of representative of National
Consumer Law Center); 1025 (statement of representative of American Bankers Association);
1368-69 (statement of representative of National Consumer Finance Association).
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whether the Commission's exclusive system of exemptions 40 or the
Judges' alternative exemption schemea I was preferable. Notwithstand-
ing the apparent lack of public support for the policy of section 6, the
Senate favored retention of section 6 over either the Judges' or Com-
mission's recommendation.42 The House version was based on the
Judges' bill and would have given debtors a choice between a uniform
bankruptcy exemption and state and federal nonbankruptcy laws.43
Although no formal House-Senate conference committee was
formed, discussions between members of both chambers led to a com-
promise in the form of section 522." Each chamber's position became
realizable, depending on the action of state legislatures. The Senate
position would prevail in states that enacted legislation to deny their
residents the alternative bankruptcy exemption. The House position
would be realized in states that did not enact "opt out" legislation. To
date, about a dozen states have considered legislation that would deny
the federal bankruptcy exemption as an alternative to the state and fed-
eral nonbankruptcy exemptions; only five, however, actually have
adopted the legislation.45
II. ANALYSIS OF THE EXEMPTION PROVISION
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 does more than merely pro-
vide debtors with certain exempt property. It additionally addresses
substantive and procedural matters that under the 1898 Act often un-
dermined the policy of the exemption laws and frustrated the adminis-
tration of debtors' estates.' For example, waivers of exemptions are
circumscribed carefully,47 and the bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction
to resolve disputes about and claims to exempt property.48 These pro-
40. See id. at 1368 (statement of representative of National Consumer Finance Association);
1658 (representative of the Dallas Bar Association).
41. See id. at 1025 (representative of American Bankers Association); 937 (representative of
National Consumer Law Center).
42. See S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 522 (1977), reprinted in 14 BANKRUPTCY REFORM
ACT OF 1978: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 97 (A. Resnick & E. Wypyski 1979).
43. See H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 522 (1977), reprinted in 12 BANKRUPTCY REFORM
ACT of 1978: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 86-87 (A. Resnick & E. Wypyski 1979).
44. See 124 CONG. REC. S17404 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini).
45. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.20 (West Cum Supp. 1979); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13: 3881(B)(West Cum. Supp. 1980) OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2329.66.2 (Page Cum. Supp. 1979); VA. CODE
§ 34-31 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The Ohio exemption statute roughly parallels the new federal exemp-
tions. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.66 (Page Cum. Supp. 1979).
46. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 170, 173.
47. See text accompanying notes 204-211 infra.
48. See text accompanying notes 54-61 infra.
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visions apparently are applicable to all exemptions, whether claimed
from state and federal nonbankruptcy law or from the bankruptcy law
itself.4 9
This part of the Article analyzes the provisions of the Act that
grant and otherwise relate to exemptions. This analysis includes criti-
cisms of technical provisions of the Act and suggestions for future revi-
sions.
.4. Jurisdiction Over Exempt Property
The 1978 Act departs sharply from the 1898 Act on the matter of
jurisdiction over exempt property. Under section 70 of the 1898 Act,
exempt property did not become part of the debtor's estate.50 Hence,
once it was determined that property was exempt,5' a bankruptcy court
lacked jurisdiction to resolve other disputes regarding it.52 Because this
resulted in confusion and inconvenience when creditors asserted that
their claims were exceptions to the exemption laws, or that their debt-
ors had waived exemption rights,5 3 the Commission made a recommen-
dation,54 which Congress accepted,55 that the bankruptcy courts have
jurisdiction to resolve all disputes regarding exempt property. This
goal is realized by first including exempt property as part of the
debtor's estate. 6 Section 522 then allows debtors to "exempt from
property of the estate" certain assets.5 7 Congress also expanded the ju-
risdiction of the district courts and their adjuncts, the bankruptcy
courts, to include "all civil proceedings arising under title 11 [Bank-
ruptcy] or arising in or related to cases under title 11 ."" Moreover, the
bankruptcy court is given "exclusive jurisdiction of all of the property,
49. See text accompanying note 204 infra.
50. 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1976) (repealed 1978). The section vested in the trustee the debtor's
title to property "except insofar as it is property which is held to be exempt."
51. Id. § 2(11), 11 U.S.C. § 11(11) (1976) (repealed 1978).
52. Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 190 U.S. 294 (1903); see V. COUNTRYMAN, DEBTOR &
CREDITOR 539-42 (1974).
53. See Countryman, supra note 22, at 708-32; Kennedy, supra note 23, at 462-69. In the
course of its opinion, the Court in Lockwood v. Exchange Bank recognized that "some inconve-
nience may arise from the construction" of the statute governing bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction of
exempt property. Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 190 U.S. 294, 300 (1903).
54. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 91, 173.
55. See HousE REPORT, supra note 8, at 49, 445-46; SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 82,
153.
56. 11 U.S.C.A. § 541 (West 1979); see HousE REPORT, supra note 8, at 176, 368; SENATE
REPORT, supra note 8, at 75-76, 82.
57. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b) (West 1979) (emphasis added).
58. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1471(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979) (emphasis added).
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wherever located, of the debtor."59 Accordingly, Congress has clearly
provided that all matters relating to exempt property are to be adjudi-
cated in the bankruptcy forum.6" This should prevent the delay, incon-
venience and unfairness6 ' that were experienced under the 1898 Act
and generally should result in the more efficient administration of debt-
ors' estates.
B. Subsection 522(b): The Grant of Exemption Rights
Subsection 522(b) contains the basic exemption rights for debtors.
As outlined above, the subsection provides for a choice between the
exemptions under state and federal nonbankruptcy law or those under
subsection 522(d)-the bankruptcy exemption provision--except in
those states that specifically have denied the option of selecting the sub-
section 522(d) alternative. The determinative state law for these mat-
ters is the law of the state "in which the debtor's domicile has been
located for the 180 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of
the petition, or for a longer portion of such 180-day period than in any
other place."62 This state law is relevant in determining both the state
exemptions that the debtor may select63 and whether the debtor may
elect exemptions under subsection 522(d) of the Act.'
If a debtor is domiciled in a state that has enacted a law denying
its residents the alternative bankruptcy exemptions, the debtor is lim-
ited to property protected from creditors by state law, plus exemptions
given by federal laws other than the federal bankruptcy law.65 If a
debtor's state has not enacted such a disqualifying law, the debtor, with
the aid of his attorney, must select between property listed in subsec-
tion 522(d) and the property exempted by state and federal nonbank-
ruptcy laws. The debtor generally will choose the alternative that most
closely matches the types and amounts of assets that he or she owns in
order to maximize his or her exemptions. In some cases, the ownership
of a single asset might dictate the choice of one of the alternatives. For
example, homestead66 and life insurance 67 exemptions in some states
59. Ad. § 1471(e).
60. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 82, 153; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 368, 445.
61. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 91.
62. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (West 1979).
63. Id. § 522(b)(2)(A).
64. Id. § 522(b)(1).
65. Id. § 522(b); see text accompanying notes 182-201 infra.
66. See, eg., CAL. Crv. CODE § 1260 (West Supp. 1978) ($40,000); FLA. CONST. art 10,
§ 4(a)(1) (no dollar limit rural homesteads limited to 160 acres; urban homes limited to one-half
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are very liberal and would allow debtors owning these assets to exempt
far more than they could under the comparable exemptions in subsec-
tion 522(d).68 A debtor who owns one of these assets might find that its
value alone exceeds the value of additional exemptions provided in
subsection 522(d) and therefore would elect the state exemptions.
Although subsection 522(b) contains the basic grant of exemption
rights, debtors enjoy comparable rights under two other provisions of
the Act. First, the Act expressly provides for the abandonment of prop-
erty of the estate by the trustee. 9 Consequently, a debtor might be
allowed to retain property that would net very little on sale, even
though the property is not exempt.70
Second, a "restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the
debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy
law is enforceable" under the new Act.71 Accordingly, debtors in the
roughly forty states72 that variously protect beneficiaries' interests in
some form of support or spendthrift trust from creditors' reach may
benefit from this provision. Moreover, since this is not a part of the
exemption law, this right is available to all debtors, including those
who elect exemptions under subsection 522(d).
In deciding to grant a blanket immunity to debtors' interests in
these trusts, Congress abandoned the more reasonable Commission
recommendation, which would have limited the effectiveness of restric-
tions on transfers to support trusts and then "only to the extent of the
income reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and his de-
pendents."73 Congress's explanation for its position is that "[tihe bank-
acre); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-01 (Supp. 1979) ($80,000); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 815.20 (West 1979)
($25,000).
67. Most states place no dollar value limit on a debtor's interest in a life insurance policy.
Eg., ALA. CODE § 6-10-8 (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.14 (West Supp. 1979); MicH. CoMP.
LAWS ANN. § 500.2207 (1967); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3911.10 (Page Supp. 1979); N.C. CONST.
art. X, § 5; OR. REv. STAT. § 743.102(1) (1977); Tx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3836(a)(6)
(Vernon Supp. 1980).
68. See text accompanying notes 89 & 132-137 infra.
69. 11 U.S.C.A. § 554 (West 1979).
70. Abandonment is common and represents a significant source of assets for debtors. Often,
debtors will be required to pay the trustee a nominal sum for abandoned items. See House Hear-
ings, supra note 9, at 781-84, 786 (statement of Professor Shuchman).
71. 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(c)(2) (West 1979).
72. See G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS 151 n.27, 152 n.29
(1973).
73. H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 4-601(b) (1975), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 9
app. I, at 165. The Senate agreed with the Commission's proposal. See S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess., § 541(c)(2) (1977), reprinted in 14 BANKRUPTCY REFORM AcT of 1978: A LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY 111 (A. Resnick & E. Wypyski 1979). It conceded this point, however, in the final negotia-
1980]
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ruptcy of the beneficiary should not be permitted to defeat the
legitimate expectations of the settlor of the trust."' 74 In addition to the
settlor's intent, however, the interests of the debtor-beneficiary's credi-
tors certainly are relevant. The congressional position causes an unjus-
tified and irrational diversion of assets from creditors to a debtor who
has separate and generally ample exemption law protections, plus a
discharge of debts.
C. Subsection 522(d): The Exempt Property Given By the New Act
The types of property exempted by the new Act are fairly typical
of those exempted by most state laws. The dollar amount limitations
on the fair market value76 of the debtor's interest 77 in the listed prop-
erty falls about midway on the continuum of the limitations of the vari-
ous state exemption laws,7 8 with a few notable exceptions.79 Wisely,
Congress has created a system to protect against the erosion of these
dollar amount limitations by inflation.80 This system should mean that
the federal bankruptcy exemption law will forego the plight of the
many state exemption laws that have become outdated.8 The Code
provides that the Judicial Conference of the United States will recom-
mend to Congress a "uniform percentage adjustment of each dollar
amount, 82 every six years beginning in 1985.83 This provision differs
from the automatic, administrative adjustment recommended by the
Commission, which would have occurred every two years.8 4 The Code
instead requires "Congress. . . to take affirmative action, by passing a
law amending the appropriate section, if it wishes to accomplish the
tions with the House. See 124 CONG. Rc. S17,413 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen.
DeConcini).
74. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 176.
75. See text accompanying notes 289-292 infra.
76. The new Act defines "value" to mean "fair market value as of the date of the filing of the
petition." I1 U.S.C.A. § 522(a)(2) (West 1979).
77. See text accompanying notes 86-88 infra.
78. During negotiations the Senate prevailed upon the House to reduce the dollar value limi-
tations that the House bill contained. See 124 CONG. REC. S17412 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (re-
marks of Sen. DeConcini).
79. See text accompanying notes 108-11 & 129-140 infra.
80. Although hard to imagine in these times, during times of deflation the dollar amounts
might also be reduced.
81. See Joslin, supra note 25, at 355-65; 6 CONN. L. REv. 142, 142-43, 149-52 (1973).
82. 11 U.S.C.A. § 104 (West 1979).
83. Id.
84. See H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1-105 (1975), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note
9, app. I, at 24-5.
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change.""5 While the Commission proposal seems preferable since it
called for more frequent and automatic adjustments, the Code provi-
sion is acceptable because it ensures that Congress periodically will be
made aware of inflation's eroding effect on the exemption provisions.
Many of the exemptions in subsection 522(d) refer to "the debtor's
interest" 86 in property. The purpose of this phraseology is to indicate
that only the debtor's equity87 interest in the property should be consid-
ered when applying the dollar value limitations. Thus, if a debtor owns
a one-half interest in property as a tenant in common, and the property
has a fair market value of $20,000 and is subject to an $8,000 mortgage,
the "debtor's interest" under subsection 522(d) is $6,000. This position
accords with state laws on the topic88 and is the accurate measure of the
value of the property actually reserved to the debtor.
1. The $7,500 General Exemption
The Act allows a debtor to exempt his interest in a residence to the
extent that the value of his interest does not exceed $7,500.89 The Act
properly extends the exemption to mobile homes and interests in coop-
eratives, as well as interests in real estate, thus recognizing these con-
temporary living styles.90 The property, however, must be the
residence of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.9' Part or all of
this $7,500 also may be used to exempt a burial plot for the debtor or
dependent.92
The $7,500 limitation on the residence exemption is quite small
85. See House REPORT, supra note 8, at 316. The House bill was changed after its Report
was written, but the change did not affect this point. See 124 CONG. REc. S 17407 (daily ed. Oct. 6,
1978).
86. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(2), (3) (West 1979). Other sections refer to "the debtor's aggregate
interest" in property. See id. § 522(d)(l),(4),(5),(6),(8).
87. "Property may be exempted even if it is subject to a lien, but only the unencumbered
portion of the property is to be counted in computing the 'value' of the property for the purposes
of exemption." House REPORT, supra note 8, at 360; SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 76.
88. Eg., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1101(C) (Cum. Supp. 1978); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1260(t)
(West Cum. Supp. 1978); see Samuels v. Delucchi, 286 F.2d 504 (9th Cir. 1961); Strangman v.
Duke, 140 Cal. App. 2d 185, 295 P.2d 12 (1956); Erlinger v. Freed, 347 Ill. 588, 180 N.E. 400
(1932); France v. Hohnbaum, 73 Neb. 74, 104 N.W. 865 (1905); New Martinsville Grocery Co. v.
Hannibal Store Co., 65 Ohio App. 50, 29 N.E.2d 226 (1940); Dallas Ceramic Co. v. Morgan, 560
P.2d 197 (Okla. 1977); Bank of Columbia v. Gibbes, 54 S.C. 579, 32 S.E. 690 (1899).
89. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(1) (West 1979).
90. Id; see Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights, 62 GEo. L.J. 779, 798-99 (1974).
91. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(1) (West 1979). The Act defines "dependent" as including a
"spouse, whether or not actually dependent." Id. § 522(a)(1).
92. Id. § 522(d)(1).
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when compared to some state homestead exemptions,93 but it is also
more generous than many other states' laws,94 particularly the six juris-
dictions that grant no homestead exemption.9 5 Assuming the desirabil-
ity of an exemption for a debtor's residence,96 the limitation will give a
debtor a reasonable equity in a residence to begin a fresh start. As the
Commission indicated, because the debtor's debts are being discharged,
it would be inappropriate to grant an exemption that was much larger
than this.97
To the extent that a debtor does not use the $7,500 residence or
burial plot exemption--either because the debtor does not own such
property or because his equity in the property is less than $7,500-the
debtor may use the unused portion of the $7,500, together with $400, to
exempt his interest in "any property."98 For example, a debtor who
owns no residence, or chooses not to exempt it, and has a $1,000 inter-
est in a burial plot would be able to exempt the full interest in the
burial plot9 9 and have a total of $6,900 to apply to the exemption of any
other property, including that not of the type listed in subsection
522(d).
Additionally, the "any property" exemption apparently may be
used to exempt the value of subsection 522(d) property in excess of the
dollar value limitation of the'specific exemption applicable to that
property. For example, the debtor might use part of the $6,900 to ex-
empt an automobile with a value of $3,000; the Act itself exempts an
automobile up to $1,200, t° and the additional $1,800 needed to exempt
it completely could come from the $6,900. Although this result is not
stated specifically in the Act or the legislative history, three reasons
support it. First, the Commission recommended to Congress that debt-
ors be allowed to use any surplus from their residence exemption only
93. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1260 (West Supp. 1978) ($40,000); FLA. CONST. art. 10, § 4(a)(l)
(no dollar limit; rural homesteads limited in size to 160 acres; urban residential lots to one-half
acre); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-01 (1978) ($60,000); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 815.20 (West 1977)
($25,000).
94. E.g., ALA. CODE § 6-10-2 (1975) ($2,000); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-2-28-1 (Bums Supp.
1979) ($5,000); NEB. REV. STAT. § 40-101 (1974) ($4,000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-372 (1969)
($1,000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.73 (Page 1953) ($1,000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-301
(Supp. 1979) ($5,000); VA. CODE § 34-4 (Supp. 1979) ($5,000).
95. The jurisdictions are Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Maryland, New
Jersey, and Pennsylvania. See UNIFORM EXEMPTIONS ACT, Prefatory note. (1979).
96. See Vukowich, supra note 90, at 805-07.
97. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 171.
98. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(5) (West 1979).
99. Id. § 522(d)(1).
100. Id. § 522(d)(2).
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to exempt certain items of property specifically listed elsewhere in the
exemption provision.101 Congress took a more liberal view by provid-
ing that debtors could apply the surplus of the $7,500 residence exemp-
tion to "any property,"' 2 including listed property. Second, the list of
property in subsection 522(d) is so comprehensive of the types of prop-
erty that are designed to fulfill the policy goals of the exemption laws
that it would undermine the purpose of the subsection to require debt-
ors to select unlisted property. Third, Congress allowed the surplus to
be taken from "any property" "in order not to discriminate against the
nonhomeowner."'° 3 Surely Congress would not otherwise discriminate
against those debtors who owned only assets listed in subsection
522(d)-presumably those best suited to debtor rehabilitation-by de-
nying them all or part of the $7,500 while giving it to debtors who
owned assets not listed in that subsection.
Allowing debtors to select as exempt "any property" in the amount
of $400 plus the surplus from the $7,500 residence and burial plot ex-
emption is sound. Some commentators have recommended that ex-
emption laws contain only this type of provision. They argue that
exemption laws should not place any restrictions on the types of prop-
erty a debtor might select; rather, the debtor should be free to choose
from his assets within a prescribed cash amount."° While such a
scheme has its virtues, it poses practical problems, 05 and the new Act
accomplishes many of the same goals by providing broad and numer-
ous categories of assets from which debtors may select their exempt
property. Furthermore, the provision allowing for the selection of "any
property" to the value of $400 plus the surplus from the $7,500 exemp-
tion permits the debtor to retain sufficient amounts of unlisted items
and of listed items in excess of their dollar value limitation.
An important function of the "any property" exemption will be to
exempt cash, earned but unpaid wages, savings and vacation pay.
These assets become part of the estate"° and are not otherwise ex-
101. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 171; H.R. 31 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-
503(b)(2) (1975), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 9, app. I, at 146-47.
102. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(5) (West 1979); see HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 361.
103. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 361; see COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 171.
This factor is very important since most debtors do not own their own homes, and Congress was
aware of this fact. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 43-44; House Hearings, supra note 9
at 774 n.26, 780 (statement of Professor Shucbman).
104. See Countryman, supra note 22, at 746-48; Comment, supra note 17, at 1507-13; Note, 53
CORNELL L. REV. 663, 671-81 (1968).
105. See Vukowich, supra note 18, at 1460.
106. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(a) (West 1979); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 367-68.
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empted by subsection 522(d). Thus, by using the "any property" ex-
emption to exempt some cash, the debtor will be able to pay rent, buy
food and meet other day-to-day expenses.
As a practical matter, most debtors will take the $7,500 exemption
via the "any property" exemption since most debtors in bankruptcy do
not own a residence. °7 Consequently, for the average debtor, there
will be a general exemption of $7,900, which can be used to exempt
"any property."
2. Personal and Household Items
Subsection 522(d) contains a variety of exemptions that relate to
personal and household items. These are all subject to some dollar
value limitation, but as explained above, a debtor may use the "any
property" exemption to effectively raise the dollar value limitation on a
specific item of exempt property.
First, the debtor's interest in an automobile'08 is exempted to the
extent the interest does not exceed $1200 in value.109 This provision is
more liberal than many state exemptions because it does not require
that the vehicle be used in the debtor's employment. 110 In addition, the
$1,200 limit is higher than limitations in some states,"' and many
states do not exempt debtors' interests in automobiles at all." 2
Debtors may also exempt a total of $500 worth of personal and
family jewelry." 3 Occupational tools and related items are exempt to
the total value of $750,114 and professionally prescribed health aids are
exempt with no dollar value limitation." 5
107. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 43-44 ("only a small percentage [of debtors]
were purchasing their own home"); see also House Hearings, supra note 9, at 774 n.26, 780.
108. More precisely, the Act exempts the debtor's interest in "one motor vehicle." I 1 U.S.C.A.
§ 522(d)(2) (West 1979). This could include a truck, tractor or motorcycle as well as a car.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.35.080(4) (1973); COLO. REV. STAT. 13-54-102(1)0) (1973);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 627.6(18) (1950); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 427.010(1), .030, .040 (1970); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 27A. 6023(a)(5) (1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-23-1(6) (1953); see Lopp v. Lopp,
118 Cal. Rptr. 338 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Kelly v. Degelau, 244 Iowa 873, 58 N.W.2d 374 (1953).
111. See CAL. Cwy. PROC. CODE § 690.2(a) (West Supp. 1979) ($500); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-
54-102(1)0) (1973) (5); NEV. REv. STAT. § 21.090(I)() (1977) ($1,000); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 23.160(1)(d) (Supp. 1977) ($800).
112. E.g., DEL. CODE tit.10 § 4902 (1975); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-504, 505
(1980); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:17-17 (West Supp. 1979); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8121-8127
(Purdon Supp. 1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 6.16.020 (Supp. 1978).
113. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(4) (West 1979).
114. Id. § 522(d)(6).
115. Id. § 522(d)(9).
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Another exemption deals with personal belongings and household
items. Unfortunately, the language of this provision is ambiguous. It
provides for the exemption of
[t]he debtor's interest, not to exceed $200 in value in any particular
item, in household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel,
appliances, books, animals, crops, or musical instruments, that are
held primarily for the personal, family, or household use of the
debtor or a dependent of the debtor." 6
The ambiguity exists because of uncertainty about the referent of the
word "item." The term could refer to items within the categories that
are listed-for example, refrigerators, kitchen tables, sofas, toasters and
suits. Alternatively, "item" could refer to the categories themselves-
for example, one "item" would be "household furnishings," and an-
other would be "wearing apparel." If "item" refers to the various types
of property within the listed categories, a very broad exemption is
granted. Subject to a $200"per item limitation, and the requirement
that the items be "primarily for the personal, family, or household use
of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor," debtors could exempt an
unlimited number of items from the various categories. Considering
that the $200 limitation is measured by the debtor's equity in the items'
fair market values on the date the petition is filed, 117 and that the value
of personal and household items depreciates considerably once the
goods are removed from stores, this exemption will encompass most of
a debtor's personal and household goods. On the other hand, if "item"
refers to each of the categories, the exemption is much less significant.
The legislative history sheds some light on the issue. The provi-
sion originally was drafted by the House. The Commission had recom-
mended the exemption of "livestock, wearing apparel, jewelry,
household furnishings, tools of the trade or profession, and motor vehi-
cles, to the aggregate value of not more than $1,000."' 1s In rewriting
this provision, the House obviously intended to enlarge on the Com-
mission's recommendation, since some of the items listed in the com-
mission's recommendation were given separate, large exemptions,11 9
and the remaining household and personal goods were supplemented
and given the "$200 in value in any particular item" exemption. 20 The
116. Id. § 522(d)(3) (emphasis added).
117. Id. § 522(a)(2), (d)(3).
118. H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-503(c)(1) (1975), reprinted in House Hearings, supra
note 9, app. I, at 147; see CoMMIssIoN REPORT, supra note 8, at 171.
119. See II U.S.C. § 522(d)(2), (4), (6) (West 1979).
120. Id. § 522(d)(4).
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House Report states,
[Tihe debtor may exempt household goods, furnishings, clothing,
and similar household items, held primarily for the personal, family,
or household use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor ....
The limitation for third category items is $300 on any particular
item.121
The italicized "items" seems to indicate that the House was using
"items" to refer to the various categories because of the reference back
to those categories through the use of the word "similar."
The more likely intention, however, was that the $200 limitation
should apply to items within the categories. First, the word "particu-
lar" indicates this; if "item" was to refer to the broad categories, there
would be no need to modify it with the word "particular". Moreover,
"particular" connotes in this context the breaking down of the catego-
ries into parts. 12 2 Second, the various categories overlap. 23 This indi-
cates that the categories were not being listed for purposes of precise
measurement of the exemption but rather to describe as broadly and
thoroughly as possible the types of property to be allowed as exempt.
Third, subsection 522(d) uses the phrase "the debtor's interest" when
the dollar value limitation is to be applied to single items. 12 4 In con-
trast, when the dollar value limitation is to be applied to a number of
items within a subsection, the phrase is always "the debtor's aggregate
interest."' 25 Because the draftsmen differentiated carefully in this re-
gard throughout subsection 522(d), and because the subsection in ques-
tion uses the phrase "the debtor's interest," it is reasonable to assume
that the $200 value limitation was meant to apply to the different items
within the categories.
Of course, the suggested construction does result in a potentially
huge exemption. This construction would allow debtors to exempt
most of their household goods and personal effects except items such as
antique or unusually expensive furniture, color televisions, pianos and
works of art. This result is consistent, however, with the House's mani-
fested intention to increase substantially a similar exemption recom-
121. House REPORT, supra note 8, at 361 (emphasis added). The $300 amount in the House
bill was reduced to $200 after negotiations with the Senate. See 124 CONG. REc. S17412 (daily ed.
Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini).
122. Webster's defines "particular" as "relating to or being a single definite ... thing as dis-
tinguished from some or all others." 2 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
1646 (15th ed. 1971). Moreover, use of the very word "item" buttresses this interpretation.
123. For example, "household goods" certainly would include "appliances."
124. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(2) (West 1979) (interest in one motor vehicle).
125. See id. §§ 522(d)(1), (4)-(6), (8).
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mended by the Commission. Moreover, the property covered by this
particular exemption normally nets a return on sale that is far below
the value of the property to its owners. 26 Indeed, this factor has been
recognized on the state level as a reason for exempting personal prop-
erty and clothing. 27 Consequently, application of the $200 dollar
value limitation to each particular item of furniture, clothing and the
like is not only consistent with the clear intention of making the exemp-
tion broad, but is also supported by sound practical considerations.
One problem with this construction, however, is how to determine
what an "item" is. The problem arises when household goods, such as
stereo systems and furniture, are claimed as exemptions. For example,
is a dining room set-buffet, table and chairs-an "item," which might
very well exceed the $200 limit, or are the "items" the individual parts
of the set? Taking this construction literally, each particular or individ-
ual item should be valued. This interpretation also would make ad-
ministration easier since it obviates the problem of determining what a
"set" is. This construction, however, raises a problem of its own. If a
table in a dining room set has a value in excess of $200 but each chair's
value is under $200, should the table alone be sold? Debtors should
handle these rare situations by using a part of their "any property"
exemption' 28 to retain items that are part of sets, but have values in
excess of $200.
3. Life Insurance
In a sharp departure from most states' positions regarding life in-
surance exemptions, Congress's bankruptcy exemption for life insur-
ance is quite conservative. Subject to certain conditions, 29 states
exempt all interests in life insurance polices, including cash surrender
values, t3° or a substantial dollar amount of the policies' values.13 1
126. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 180; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 127.
127. See Vukowich, supra note 90, at 787-88 & nn.47 & 50.
128. See text accompanying notes 98-107 supra.
129. The usual condition is that the policy beneficiary be a dependent or relative of the in-
sured. See Vukowich, upra note 90, at 808-809.
130. E.g., ALA. CODE § 6-10-8 (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 30-208 (1962); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 222.14 (West 1977); IowA CODE ANN. § 511.37 (West 1949); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-414(a)
(1964); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 24.1 2207 (1972); MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-3-11 (1973); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 42-10-3 (1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 743.102(1) (1977); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
3836(a)(6) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
131. Eg., Apiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1126(1) (Supp. 1979) ($10,000); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-54-102(1)(/) (1973) ($5,000); MIss. CODE ANN. § 85-3-11 (1973) ($50,000). Other juris-
dictions limit the exemption by reference to the annual premium. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
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Congress followed the Commission's general recommendation that
these large state exemptions should be curtailed in the bankruptcy ex-
emption. 132
The new Act has two provisions regarding life insurance. One ex-
empts "any unmatured life insurance contract owned by the debtor,
other than a credit life insurance contract."'' 33 As explained in the
House Report, this
[the quoted phrase] refers to the life insurance contract itself. It does
not encompass any other rights under the contract, such as the right
to borrow out the loan value. Because of this provision, the trustee
may not surrender a life insurance contract, which remains property
of the debtor if he chooses the Federal exemptions.134
This provision continues in a different manner the protection of the
1898 Act against forfeiture of life insurance policies. 135 It protects
debtors against having to find new insurance at a higher rate or at a
time when they may be uninsurable. Life insurance policies with no
loan or cash surrender value would be completely exempt under this
provision.
For life insurance policies that do have a loan value, a separate
provision allows debtors to exempt up to $4,000 "in any accrued divi-
dend or interest under or loan value" of the policies.' 36 The debtor
must own the life insurance contract and either the debtor or a person
of whom the debtor is a dependent must be the insured to qualify for
the exemption.' 37 Loan value, rather than cash surrender value, 38 is
used to measure the exemption's limit because it assumes that policies
will remain in force until the next premium anniversary; a determina-
tion of surrender value, on the other hand, normally assumes that the
§ 690.9 (West Supp. 1980); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-5814(7) (1964); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 21.090(1)(/) (1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-23-1(8) (1953).
132. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 183 Plumb, supra note 23, at 61-72; Vukowich,
supra note 18, 1462-67.
133. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(7) (West 1979).
134. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 361.
135. See Bankruptcy Act § 70(a)(5), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(5) (1976) (repealed 1978).
136. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(8) (West 1979). Subtracted from the $4,000 would be automatic
payments from loan value on behalf of the debtor to an insurance company to pay a premium or
to carry out a nonforfeiture option after the date of bankruptcy. -d.; see id. § 542(d).
137. Id. § 522(d)(8).
138. The Commission's proposal was that $1,500 in cash surrender value be exempt. This was
changed by the House, apparently at the suggestion of the American Life Insurance Association,
to $5,000 in loan value. See House Hearings, supra note 9, at 1585-86; H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 522(d)(8) (1977), reprinted in 12 BANKRUPTCY REFORM AcT of 1978: A LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY 397 (A. Resnick & E. Wypyski 1979).
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policy will be surrendered and the insurance terminated. 3 9 If the loan
values of a debtor's life insurance exceed the $4,000, the trustee will be
entitled to the excess for distribution to creditors."4
The new Act's life insurance exemption is reasonable. It preserves
debtors' life insurance policies while not allowing them to be harbors of
wealth at the expense of creditors.
4. Current and Future Income Sources
Debtors' rights to receive a variety of public benefits are preserved
by the new Act. 4 ' Most of these benefits also are exempt under state 4
2
and other federal laws143 if debtors decline to elect the federal bank-
ruptcy exemptions. These include social security benefits,144 unem-
ployment compensation, 45 local public assistance benefits, 146 veterans'
benefits, 47 and disability, illness, or unemployment benefits.' 48 Addi-
tionally, a debtor may exempt rights to receive alimony, support and
separate maintenance payments to the extent that these are reasonably
necessary for the support of the debtor and his or her dependents. 49
The Act fails to exempt rights under a property settlement agreement
and, instead, expressly indicates that these rights are property of the
estate.'50 This result is justified when the property settlement is just
that and nothing more. Often, however, rights in the nature of support
may be provided in a property settlement agreement.' 51 The courts
should not be bound by the labels that the spouses or their attorneys
use, but should scrutinize the settlement and alimony arrangements,
and exempt the property and rights that actually represent future sup-
port.' 52
Finally, the right to receive payments under a qualifying "stock
139. See House Hearings, supra note 9, pt. 3, at 1585 n.3.
140. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 361; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 172.
141. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(10) (West 1979).
142. See Vukowich, supra note 90, at 820-24.
143. See id.
144. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(10)(A) (West 1979).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. § 522(d)(10)(B).
148. Id. § 522(d)(10)(C).
149. Id. § 522(d)(10)(D). For a discussion of the phrase "reasonably necessary for the support
of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor," see text accompanying notes 334-345 infra.
150. 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(a)(5)(B) (West 1979).
151. See Loiseaux, Domestic Obligations in Bankruptcy, 41 N.C.L. Rv. 27 (1962).
152. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(10)(D) (West 1979).
1980]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
bonus, pension, profit sharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract on
account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service" is exempt
to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and his
dependents. 5
3
The exemption of these various support items seems to apply only
to the "right to receive"'154 them in the future. 5  Consequently, if pay-
ments from these sources have been made prior to the filing of the peti-
tion, 156 and are held as cash or in a bank account, they should be
property of the estate and not exempt. Another part of subsection
522(d) extends the exemption of some parts of the estate to both "the
debtor's right to receive, or properly that is traceable to" various
sources.' 57 The absence of similar language in the future income sec-
tion clearly indicates Congress's intent. Although this result has been
criticized, 58 debtors can find relief in the "any property" exemption 59
and protect these funds in that way.
A further question arises concerning payments from these income
sources that were due but unpaid at the time the petition was filed.
This is especially relevant regarding the alimony and support exemp-
tion.' 60 On the one hand, at the time of bankruptcy the debtor does
have the "right to receive"' 61 such payments, and this literal compli-
ance with the statute might indicate that the unpaid monies are exempt.
It seems more reasonable, however, that these unpaid monies should be
available to creditors. Congress's purpose apparently was to preserve
only that which is due the debtor after the petition was filed 62 and to
give to creditors that which was part of the estate prior to bankruptcy.
In some cases, the nonpayment-for example, of alimony-may be the
cause of, or a contributing factor to, the debtor's bankruptcy; it seems
fair and consonant with the congressional intent that payments that are
153. Id. § 522(d)(10)(E). Certain plans or contracts must qualify under I.R.C. §§ 401(a),
403(a), 403(b), 408 or 409. The original House provision was expanded to include plans qualify-
ing under additional sections of the Internal Revenue Code. See House Hearings, supra note 91,
at 1585.
154. Id § 522(d)(10).
155. "Paragraph (10) exempts certain benefits that are akin to future earnings of the debtor."
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 362 (emphasis added).
156. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 301, 303(b) (West 1979).
157. Id § 522(d)(1 I).
158. Dunham, Tracing the Proceeds ofExempt Assets in Bankruptcy & Nonbankruptcy Cases,
[1978] S. ILL. U.L.J. 317, 343.
159. See text accompanying notes 98-107 supra.
160. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(10)(D) (West 1979).
161. Id. § 522(d)(10).
162. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8 at 362, quoted at note 155 supra.
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recovered should be made available to creditors. Moreover, once a
payment to the debtor has become due, the debtor has a cause of action
for the payment; accordingly, this cause of action would pass to the
estate as of the date the petition was filed.163 Therefore, it appears that
the right in these cases is a present one and not the right to future in-
come that Congress sought to protect in subsection 522(d)(10).
5. Loss Compensation
A final exemption protects compensation for a variety of losses.
The exemption extends to "the right to receive" the compensation as
well as to property that is "traceable to" the compensation. 164 One type
of compensation that is protected is "an award under a crime victim's
reparation law."'16' A related exemption covers, to a maximum of
$7,500, payments "on account of personal bodily injury" of the debtor
or a person of whom the debtor is a dependent. 66 This specific provi-
sion, however, is rather confusingly qualified; compensation for "pain
and suffering or. . .actual pecuniary loss" is excluded from the ex-
emption.'67 The House Report elaborates:
This provision ... is designed to cover payments in compensation of
actual bodily injury, such as the loss of a limb, and is not intended to
include the attendant costs that accompany such a loss, such as medi-
cal payments, pain and suffering, or loss of earnings. Those items are
handled separately by the bill.16
8
This provision, and the House's explanation for it, are troubling.
With the exclusions of loss of earnings, pain and suffering, and medical
payments, there appears to be nothing for the $7,500 to cover. 169 Pre-
sumably, Congress intended the $7,500 to apply to the loss of enjoy-
ment of life that is caused by the bodily injury since this is the only type
of loss that does not clearly fall within the excluded categories of
losses. 170 Another problem is that, contrary to the statement of the
House Report, the excluded losses are not all covered by other exemp-
tions. Pain and suffering damages are exempt; medical payments might
163. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 541 (West 1979).
164. Id. § 522(d)(I 1).
165. Id. § 522(d)(1 1)(A).
166. Id. § 522(d)(11)(D).
167. Id.
168. HousE REPoRT, supra note 8, at 362.
169. See D. DOBBS, REMEDIES 540-51 (1973) (three types of personal injury damages are for
earnings, medical and related expenses, and pain and suffering).
170. See id. 548-49. Some courts have not recognized this separate type of loss, and others
include it as a type of suffering. Id.
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be, depending on the circumstances. 7 1 Compensation for lost future
earnings of the debtor or a person of whom the debtor is a dependent
are given a separate exemption, 72 which applies to the extent the com-
pensation is reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and his
dependents.73
Failure to exempt payments for medical payments is unwise and,
in fact, may have been a legislative oversight. The Commission had
recommended a complete exemption of compensation for personal in-
juries. 1" 4 The House reorganized the Commission's recommended pro-
vision and rewrote substantial parts of it. Possibly, the draftsmen
erroneously believed that they had included medical expense compen-
sation elsewhere.' This would explain the Report's erroneous state-
ment that "[t]hose items are handled separately by the bill,"'176 and
another statement in the Report that "certain tort judgments" are ex-
empt.1 77 Alternatively, the House Report may have mistakenly identi-
fied "medical payments" as one of the items excluded by the statute's
phrase "actual pecuniary lOSS.' I7  Medical liabilities incurred by a per-
son arguably are not comprehended by this phrase; "actual pecuniary
loss" may refer only to gains-in the form of profits or earnings-that
have been prevented or lost by the injury. In any event, Congress
should address this matter. Allowing creditors to reach compensation
for medical care seems unjustified.
Two other types of compensation are exempted. If a person of
whom the debtor was a dependent dies, payments under a life insur-
ance contract 7 9 or on account of wrongful death'80 are exempt. Again,
the exemption applies only to the extent that the payments are reason-
ably necessary for the support of the debtor and her dependents.' 81
171. See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 522(d)(10)(A), (C), (I l)(A), (B) (West 1979).
172. Id. § 522(d)(11)(E).
173. Id. For a discussion of "reasonably necessary," see text accompanying notes 334-45 infra.
174. See H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-503(C)(8) (1975) reprintedin House Hearings, supra
note 9, app. I, at 148; CoMMissIoN REPORT, supra note 8, at 172.
175. The Commission's complete exemption of compensation for personal injury was in the
same provision as unemployment compensation. See id. The House did continue the complete
exemption of unemployment compensation, see 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(lO)(A) (West 1979), but
omitted personal injury compensation.
176. HousE REPORT, supra note 8, at 362, quotedat text accompanying note 168 supra.
177. HousE REPORT, supra note 8, at 126.
178. I1 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(ll)(D) (West 1979).
179. Id. § 522(d)( 11)(C) (West 1979).
180. Id. § 522(d)(l1)(B).
181. Id. § 522(d)(ll)(B), (C). For a discussion of this limitation on the exemption, see text
accompanying notes 334-345 infra.
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D. State and Nonbankruptcy Federal Exemptions
All debtors have the right to elect the exemptions given by the laws
of their state of residence and those allowed under federal, nonbank-
ruptcy law. State exemption laws vary considerably. The federal ex-
emptions include such assets as social security benefits,1 882 veterans'
benefits,183 civil servants' retirement income,"s ' railroaders' unemploy-
ment185 and retirement 86 benefits, compensation and benefits under
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 187 and
foreign service retirement and disability benefits.' 88 The Supreme
Court's decision in Kokoszka v. Belford,8 9 however, has been con-
strued by lower courts to mean that the restriction on garnishment in
Title III of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act' is not a fed-
eral "exemption."'' Although this construction of Kokoszka does not
seem warranted, 192 it would continue to deny debtors' claims of exemp-
182. See 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1976).
183. 38 U.S.C. § 3101(a) (1976).
184. 5 U.S.C. § 8346(a) (1976).
185. 45 U.S.C. § 352(e) (1976).
186. Id. § 231(m) (1976).
187. 33 U.S.C. § 916 (1976).
188. 22 U.S.C. § 1104 (1976).
189. 417 U.S. 642 (1974).
190. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677 (1976).
191. Eg., Usery v. First Nat'l Bank, 586 F.2d 107 (9th Cir. 1978); Dunlop v. First Nat'1 Bank,
399 F. Supp. 855 (D. Ariz. 1975); Miller v. Monrean, 507 P.2d 771 (Alas. 1973); see also In re
Brissette, 561 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1977).
192. Kokoszka involved the narrow issues of whether an income tax refund is property of a
debtor's estate and, if so, whether it was exempt under Title III of the Consumer Credit Protection
Act. The Court correctly concluded that the refund was property of the estate since it was not
necessary for a fresh start. The Court next correctly decided that the tax refund was not exempt.
Although some language of the opinion intimates that Title III was not designed to apply in
bankruptcy, but was only designed to prevent bankruptcy, see 417 U.S. at 650-51, the Court con-
cluded that "if, despite its protection, bankruptcy did occur, the debtor's protection and remedy
remained under the Bankruptcy Act." Id. at 651. The Court noted that the Bankruptcy Act,
"provides that the [Bankruptcy] Act 'shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions
which are prescribed by the laws of the United States,"' id. at 649 (quoting Bankruptcy Act § 6,
11 U.S.C. § 24 (1976) (repealed 1978)). The Court then went on to agree with the court of appeals
that a tax refund did not come under title Ilrs protection of "earnings" or "disposable earnings."
417 U.S. at 651-52. That result is justified since the debtor will have current earnings to protect
with the exemption; tax refunds seem unrelated to what Congress was striving to protect.
To interpret Kokoszka as holding that title III is not an exemption under federal law at all, as
courts recently have been doing, see cases cited note 191 supra, is unwarranted. In the first place,
if it is not an exemption law, it is difficult to say what is. Indeed, it appears to be a paradigm of an
exemption law, given the traditional goals of exemption laws. Second, Kokoszka must be inter-
preted in light of its facts; so interpreted it merely means that income tax refunds are not "earn-
ings" within title III. Third, because Congress made title III preemptive of all state laws that were
less protective of debtors, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1673(c), 1675, 1677 (1976), many states amended their
laws to conform to title 1II. If these state laws-which supplanted wage exemptions--are now
held to be something less than exemptions, in line with recent court interpretations of Kokoszka,
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tions of earnings under the federal law. Their state laws, however,
might provide an exemption for eamings. 93
In addition to the exempt property provided by state and federal
nonbankruptcy laws, debtors may exempt their interests as joint ten-
ants19 4 or tenants by the entirety to the extent that these interests are
"exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law."' 9 The
congressional intent seems clear. Under the 1898 Act, a bankrupt's in-
terest in tenancy by the entirety property did not pass to his trustee
under section 70 if, as was often the case,' 96 that interest was not trans-
ferrable by the bankrupt or reachable by his creditors. 197 The new Act,
however, provides that these interests become part of the estate.' 98
Hence, the exemption of these interests by the new Act was designed to
leave undisturbed the results reached with respect to tenancy by the
entirety property under the 1898 Act.
This congressional deference to nuances of state property law is
unjustified. 199 Moreover, allowing the exemption without any limita-
tion seems unwise. Most other exemptions are subject to some dollar
value limitations, 2°° and to the further requirement that the exempt
property must be helpful to or necessary for family support. Unlike
property exempted under homestead laws,20 ' exempt tenancy by the
entirety property does not have to be used as a residence. Thus, a
debtor and his or her spouse could hold investment property as tenants
by the entirety and claim it as exempt. Similarly, in about one-third of
the states that recognize tenancies by the entirety in personal prop-
protection of debtors' wages will be lost in bankruptcy although state legislatures clearly had no
such intent.
193. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-10-7 (1975); CAL. CIV. PROC.CODE § 723.050-.052 (West Supp.
1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 62, § 73 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A. 4031
(1980); WASH. REV. CODE § 6.16.020 (Supp. 1978); see also In re Brissette, 561 F.2d 779, 785-87
(9th Cir. 1977).
194. Apparently, in most jurisdictions state law does not prevent creditors from collecting
against joint tenancy property. See S. RIESENFELD, CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PRO-
TECTION 113 (3d ed. 1979).
195. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b)(2)(B) (West 1979).
196. See S. RiESENFELD, supra note 194, at 114, 570-71.
197. Bankruptcy Act § 70(a)(5), 11 U.S.C. § 1 10(a)(5) (1976) (repealed 1978). See Plumb,
supra note 23, 126-29; S. RIESENFELD, supra note 194, at 570-71.
198. 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(a)(1) (West 1979); see id. § 363(h); SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at
56-67, 82-83.
199. See text accompanying notes 289-92 infra.
200. See text accompanying notes 89, 109, 113 & 114 supra.
201. The new Act exempts property that the "debtor uses as a residence," 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 522(d)(1) (West 1979), subject to a $7,500 limitation. State homestead laws require that the
homestead be used as the debtor's residence. See Vukowich, supra note 90, at 804-05.
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erty,20 2 debtors might hold large sums in bank accounts203 and claim
them as exempt. Such a result seems indefensible given the exemptions
already provided to debtors and the discharge of debts.
E. Provisions to Ensure the Realization of Exemption Goals
Two provisions of the new Act are designed to ensure that the pro-
tedtions given debtors by the exemption laws are not improvidently
lost. These provisions apply whether the debtor elects exemptions
under subsection 522(d) or under state and other federal exemption
laws.2" First the Act renders unenforceable waivers of exemptions
given to creditors who hold unsecured 0 claims.2°" Furthermore, credi-
tors with nonpossessory, nonpurchase money secured claims and waiv-
ers will not be able to enforce their rights against exempt household
and personal items,20 7 occupational items 20 8 or health aids.209 These
provisions were recommended by the Commission2 'and adopted by
Congress.211
202. See Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 8 (1959).
203. See, e.g., Hagerty v. Hagerty, 52 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1951); Bailey v. Smith, 89 Fla. 303, 103
So. 833 (1925); In re Estate of O'Neal, 409 S.W.2d 85 (Mo. 1966).
204. Both § 522(e) and § 522(1) refer to exemptions "under subsection (b) of this section."
Subsection (b) contains both the § 522(d) alternative and that of state and federal nonbankruptcy
laws. See HousE REPORT, supra note 8, at 362. Problems arise, however, when a debtor has
chosen state law exemptions, and the state law differs from the Act's provisions with respect to
waivers and nonpurchase money security interests in exempt property. See text accompanying
notes 312-17 infra.
205. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 506 (West 1979) (determining secured claims).
206. Id. § 522(e).
207. Id. § 522(f)(2)(A).
208. Id. § 522(f)(2)(B).
209. Id. § 522(f)(2)(C).
210. See CoMMIssIoN REPORT, supra note 8, at 182-84.
211. The House Report explains the reasons for the provisions:
Frequently, creditors lending money to a consumer debtor take a security interest in all
of the debtor's belongings, and obtain a waiver by the debtor of his exemptions. In most
of these cases, the debtor is unaware of the consequences of the forms he signs. The
creditor's experience provides him with a substantial advantage. If the debtor encounters
financial difficulty, creditors often use threats of repossession of all of the debtor's house-
hold goods as a means of obtaining payment.
In fact, were the creditor to carry through on his threat and foreclose on the prop-
erty, he would receive little, for household goods have little resale value. They are far
more valuable to the creditor in the debtor's hands, for they provide a credible basis for
the threat, because the replacement costs of the goods are generally high. Thus, creditors
rarely repossess, and debtors, ignorant of the creditors' true intentions, are coerced into
payments they simply cannot afford to make.
The exemption provision allows the debtor, after bankruptcy has been filed, and
creditor collection techniques have been stayed, to undo the consequences of a contract
of adhesion, signed in ignorance, by permitting the invalidation of nonpurchase money
security interests in household goods. Such security interests have too often been used by
over-reaching creditors. The bill eliminates any unfair advantage creditors have.
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Nonpurchase money security interests will be valid with respect to
other exempt assets such as homes212 and automobiles. Creditors tak-
ing security interests in these more substantial assets will know that
they are secure even if bankruptcy should intervene. This frees the
more substantial assets of debtors, which are more realistically taken as
collateral. Consequently, debtors may use these more substantial assets
to obtain credit,2 13 while those assets which are more essential to the
family and which are often taken as collateral only as a device to coerce
payment214 are protected.215
In addition to nonpurchase money security interests, the Act al-
lows debtors to avoid judicial liens216 on exempt property.21 7 Unfortu-
nately, this provision appears to conflict with another provision of the
Act that specifically recognizes the enforceability of nonvoidable
liens218 against exempt property. The legislative history sheds some
light on the conflict but is also a bit confusing. Taken literally, the
section allows debtors to "avoid a judicial lien on any property to the
extent that the property could have been exempted in the absence of
the lien.' 2 1 9  This would allow for the avoidance of, for example, a
judgment lien that arose five years before bankruptcy on real estate
that is being claimed as exempt.20 Subsection 522(c)(2), however, ex-
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 127 (footnotes omitted). For a very recent North Carolina case
depicting facts similar to those described in the House Report, see Montford v. Grohman, 36 N.C.
App. 733, 245 S.E.2d 219 (1978).
The last paragraph of the House Report is misleading because it implies that only the effects
of "contracts of adhesion, signed in ignorance" may be avoided by debtors. The Act, however,
invalidates all nonpurchase money security interests in the listed items and renders unenforceable
all waivers regardless of the nature of the contract or conditions under which it was signed. I I
U.S.C.A. § 522(f) (West 1979).
212. Waivers of the homestead exemption generally are upheld under state laws. See, e.g.,
Agronaut Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 261 N.W.2d 743 (Minn. 1978); see also ALA. CODE § 6-10-120
(1976); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-I 103(A)(1) (1956); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 52, § 4 (Smith-Hurd
Cum. Supp. 1979).
213. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 173.
214. See note 211 supra.
215. The new Act generally conforms to state laws on these matters, see Vukowich, supra note
18, at 1469; Annot., 94 A.L.R.2d 967 (1964), although it appears to be somewhat more protective
of debtors, see, e.g., Broadway v. Household Fin. Corp., 351 So. 2d 1373 (Ala. Civ. App.), cert.
denied, 351 So. 2d 1378 (Ala. 1977); Montford v. Grohman, 36 N.C. App. 733, 245 S.E.2d 219,
appeal dismissed, 295 N.C. 551, 248 S.E.2d 727 (1978) (although state law prohibits waiver of
exemptions, lender's security interest in all of debtor's possessions enforceable).
216. The new Act defines "judicial lien" to mean "lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestra-
tion, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding." 11 U.S.C.A. 101(27) (West 1979).
217. .1d. § 522(f).
218. Id. § 522(c)(2). The nonvoidability has reference to the trustee's various voiding powers
and not to § 522().
219. HousE REPORT, supra note 8, at 362; SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 76.
220. It would also seem to apply to a lien that existed when the debtor purchased the property.
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pressly recognizes the enforceability of such a lien against exempt
property,221 and the legislative history of that section states, "The rule
of Long v. Bullard. .. is accepted with respect to the enforcement of
valid liens on nonexempt property as well as on exempt property."'222
While Long v. Bullard involved a "lien created by contract,' 223 a judg-
ment lien is nonetheless a "valid lien." Moreover, the legislative his-
tory is especially confusing in light of the separate provision, discussed
above in this subsection,224 that renders unenforceable nonpossessory,
nonpurchase money security interests in items of exempt personal
property.
To further confound matters, at one point the House Report indi-
cates that the avoidance of judicial liens on exempt property is
designed to allow "the debtor to undo the actions of creditors that bring
legal action against the debtor shortly before bankruptcy. . . . If a
creditor beats the debtor into court, the debtor is nevertheless entitled
to his exemptions. 225 This explanation is unconvincing. First, the
provision does not limit the right of avoidance to any time period
before bankruptcy. Second, other provisions allow debtors to exempt
property free from judicial liens that were obtained within a short pe-
riod before bankruptcy. 226 Consequently, the congressional intention
remains obscure due to the unclear legislative history and conflicting
statutory framework.
Until the matter is resolved by Congress, the courts should refuse
to enforce nonpossessory, nonpurchase money interests in exempt
household and personal items, in occupational items and in health aids.
They should recognize, however, the enforceability of those security
interests in other exempt items such as the home and automobiles.
Congress's intent on these matters seems rather clear.227 Judgment and
other nonconsensual liens should, however, be enforceable unless they
The implication of the House and Senate Reports is that the debtor could free his newly acquired
property from the preexisting lien by a claim of exemption. Such a result seems manifestly unfair
to the lien creditor.
221. II U.S.C.A. § 522(c)(2) (West 1979). This section is discussed in more detail at text ac-
companying notes 250-53 infra.
222. HousE REPORT, supra note 8, at 361 (citing Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617 (1886)) (em-
phasis added).
223. 117 U.S. at 621.
224. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(f)(2) (West 1979); see text accompanying notes 205-13 supra.
225. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 126-27.
226. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(g)-(i), (j) (West 1979).
227. See text accompanying notes 212-15 supra.
1980]
NORTH CAROLINA LWREVIEWo
are otherwise voidable under other provisions of the Act.228 This result
seems consistent with the thrust of the legislative history in that it rec-
ognizes creditors' legitimate interests in debtors' property under state
law22 9 and yet allows for the avoidance of those liens that are otherwise
voidable under provisions of the Act.
F Debts and Liens Enforceable Against Exempt Property
The exemption provisions ensure that the exempt property will not
be liquidated for the purpose of paying dividends to creditors.230 The
Act goes further and provides that the exempt property also is pro-
tected "after the case."'23' This ensures that the exempt property is pro-
tected against creditors whose claims are nondischargeable.232 These
general rules, however, are expressly qualified by two categories of ex-
ceptions. First, otherwise exempt property is liable both during and
after the case to satisfy nondischargeable tax claims and family support
claims.2 33 Second, exempt property remains subject to tax and other
nonvoidable liens. 34 These debts and liens are, then, exceptions to the
exemption policy of the Act. The exceptions apply whether the debtor
elects exemptions under subsection 522(d) or under state and federal
nonbankruptcy laws.235
The provision that nondischargeable 236 tax debts are collectible
against exempt property is an example of the Treasury Department's
228. See I I U.S.C.A. § 522(g)-(i), (j) (West 1979).
229. See text accompanying notes 221-23 supra.
230. The exemption of property also may result in less or no payment to the trustee. See
House Hearings, supra note 9, at 768-69, 773.
231. II U.S.C.A. § 522(c) (West 1979).
232. See id. § 523(a); Vukowich, supra note 18, at 1453-54.
233. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(c)(1) (West 1979).
234. Id. § 522(c)(2).
235. The subsection refers to "property exempted under this section," and both alternative sets
of exemptions are provided for under subsection b of the section. Unlike subsections (e) and (0,
however, no express reference is made to subsection (b). This is most likely an insignificant varia-
tion in drafting. For reasons discussed later, however, see text accompanying notes 301-11 infra,
numerous problems arise when state exemption laws' own exceptions are considered. This might
indicate that Congress intended its list of exceptions to apply only if exemptions were being
elected under § 522(d).
236. The Senate's bill would have permitted all tax claims to be enforceable against exempt
property. See S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., § 522(c)(3) (1977), reprinted in, 14 BANKRUPTCY RE-
FORM AcT OF 1978: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 97-98 (A. Resnick & E. Wypyski 1979); SENATE
REPORT, supra note 8, at 76. The Senate subsequently conceded to limit the exception to nondis-
chargeable tax claims under § 523(a)(1). See 124 CONG. REc. S17412 (daily ed., Oct. 6, 1978)
(remarks of Sen. DeConcini).
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tenacity in protecting the national purse.237 The Treasury, qua tax col-
lector, already enjoys numerous advantages over other creditors. Tax
claims constitute a complete exception to the federal restriction on gar-
nishment,238 and state exemption laws are inapplicable when federal
tax claims are being collected.239 A separate, very niggardly exemption
is provided debtor-taxpayers in the Internal Revenue Code;240 fortu-
nately, while considering the bankruptcy legislation, Congress has be-
come aware of this sorry and archaic Code provision and has indicated
its intention of "increasing the exemptions to more realistic levels."' 24'
Given the federal government's favored creditor status, the exception
for nondischargeable tax claims is unwarranted. The federal govern-
ment should be willing to subordinate its interest as creditor to the fed-
eral bankruptcy goal of ensuring fresh starts for debtors. The priority
status given tax claims by the Act 242 and the nondischargeability of tax
claims243 are more than enough protection for the federal purse.244
The exception of family support obligations, such as alimony,
maintenance, and child support, is common to the federal restriction on
garnishment 245 and many state exemption statutes. 246 Even without an
express statutory exception, courts have frequently allowed family sup-
port claims to be enforceable against exempt property on the ground
that a basic goal of the exemption laws is to protect debtors' families.24 7
237. See The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Autumn 1977, at
166 (comments of Professor Shuchman).
238. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1673(b)(1)(C) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
239. E.g., Kyle v. McGuirk, 82 F.2d 212, 213 (3d Cir. 1936); Cannon v. Nicholas, 80 F.2d 934,
936 (10th Cir. 1935); Knox v. Great W. Life Assurance Co., 109 F. Supp. 207, 211-12 (E.D. Mich.
1952), aJ'dper curiam, 212 F.2d 784 (6th Cir. 1954); Birch v. Dodt, 2 Ariz. App. 228, 229-30, 407
P.2d 417, 418-19 (1965).
240. IR.C. § 6334(a), (c).
241. 124 CONG. REC. Hl 1113 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards); see 124
CONG. REc. S17430 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini).
242. 11 U.S.C.A. § 507(a)(6) (West 1979).
243. Id. § 523(a)(1).
244. The Commission's proposal excluded tax claims as exceptions to its exemption law. See
H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-503(a) (1975), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 9, app. I,
at 146.
245. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1673(b)(1)(A), (2) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
246. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 11-207(2) (1979) (personal earnings); Ky. REv. STAT. § 427.010(3)(a)
(1970) (earnings); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 188, § 1(4) (Law. Co-op Supp. 1980) (homestead); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 452.140 (Vernon 1977) (no property exempt); Oro REv. CODE ANN. § 3113.21(A)
(Page 1980) (personal earnings).
247. E.g., AT&T v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979); Cody v. Riecker, 594 F.2d 314 (2d Cir.
1979); Senco of Florida, Inc. v. Clark, 473 F. Supp. 902 (M.D. Fla. 1979); Cartledge v. Miller, 457
F. Supp. 1146 & n.42 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Hilltop Auto Salvage, Inc. v. Mason, 132 Ga. App. 746,209
S.E.2d 25 (1974); Pope v. Pope, 283 Md. 531, 390 A.2d 1128 (1978); Hirko v. Hirko, 166 NJ.
Super. 111, 398 A.2d 1353 (Ch. Div. 1979); Brown v. Brown, 32 Ohio App. 2d 139, 140-41, 288
1980]
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These statutory and judicial positions regarding family support claims
are generally sound. Granting an unlimited exception to debtors' ex-
emption rights in bankruptcy, however, goes too far. Theoretically, a
debtor could be deprived of all his exempt assets because of tax and
family support debts. Recently, Congress changed the federal restric-
tion on garnishment to limit the amount of earnings that could be gar-
nished by family support claimants.248 This same sensitivity to debtors'
needs should be reflected in the exceptions to exemptions in bank-
ruptcy. Given the variety in both kind and amount of property in-
volved in bankruptcy, a precise formula such as the one in the federal
restriction on garnishment24 9 would be inappropriate. The bankruptcy
courts, however, could be charged with making an equitable distribu-
tion of assets according to the relative needs of the debtor and his new
family, if any, and the support claimants.
A final group of exceptions is created in favor of liens that are not
avoided by the trustee's various powers.25 0 This exception recognizes
the validity of real estate mortgages and purchase money security inter-
ests in personal property."' In addition, nonpurchase money security
interests in more substantial exempt assets such as automobiles are
valid.25 2 As previously discussed, 2 3 however, the validity of nonvoid-
able judicial liens on exempt property is unclear.
Because the Act singles out creditors who can enforce their claims
against exempt property, the question of whether marshaling is appro-
priate arises. For example, if a creditor with liens on both exempt and
nonexempt property is involved in a case and has priority over other
creditors who have liens on the nonexempt property, can those other
creditors invoke the doctrine of marshaling to force him to satisfy his
claim first from the exempt property?254 And, should marshaling re-
quire the government's tax claims to be satisfied from exempt assets so
N.E.2d 852, 853-54 (1972); Huskey v. Batts, 530 P.2d 1375 (Okla. App. 1974); Calvin v. Calvin, 6
Or. App. 572,487 P.2d 1164 (1971); Commonwealth exrel. Magrini v. Magrini, 398 A.2d 179 (Pa.
Super. 1979). Contra, Miller v. Superior Ct., 69 Cal. 2d 14, 442 P.2d 663, 69 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1968);
York v. York, 249 S.W.2d 870 (Mo. App. 1952); Fowler v. Fowler, 116 N.H. 446, 362 A.2d 204
(1976).
248. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1673(b)(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
249. Id.
250. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(c)(2) (West 1979). In addition, a tax lien, notice of which has been
filed but which is avoided because invalid against bona fide purchasers under id. § 545(2), see 26
U.S.C. § 6323(b), (1976), is also an excepted lien.
251. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 361.
252. See text accompanying notes 212-215 supra.
253. See text accompanying notes 216-226 supra.
254. It is also an issue in cases in which a lien creditor has a lien on both exempt and nonex-
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that they do not consume part or all of the nonexempt assets by virtue
of their priority status?2"5 The answer to both questions should be
"no." Indeed, the doctrine of marshaling should only be available to
the debtor to require creditors whose debts are exceptions or who have
liens on both exempt and nonexempt assets to exhaust nonexempt as-
sets before seeking satisfaction from exempt assets.256 Cases have long
recognized an exception to the doctrine of marshaling when one credi-
tor may collect against alternate funds and one of those funds is ex-
empt.257 In line with these cases, the Supreme Court has refused to
invoke the doctrine of marshaling when to do so would have frustrated
the policy of the exemption laws.25 Allowing the debtor to invoke the
doctrine to force a creditor to seek satisfaction from nonexempt assets
might seem contrary to the creditor's rights.259 The creditor, however,
will still be paid in full, and this should be his only concern. The very
purpose of the exemption laws is to protect debtors to the prejudice of
their creditors. To allow marshaling to the detriment of general credi-
tors is perfectly compatible, therefore, with the basic legislative policy
in having exemptions. 60 Consequently, the courts now recognize the
debtor's right to force the creditor to seek satisfaction from nonexempt
assets.261 The same rule should be followed under the new bankruptcy
law.
. Proceduresfor Claiming Exemptions
A separate provision of the Act provides that the debtor shall file a
list of property that is being claimed as exempt.2 62 If the debtor does
not file the list, a dependent may do so on the debtor's behalf. 6 These
empt property. May the general creditors invoke marshaling to force the lien creditor to satisfy his
claim from the exempt property?
255. See I I U.S.C.A. § 507(a)(6) (West 1979).
256. See generally Vernon, Marshalling of Real Security Interests, I How. L.J. 172, 180-81
(1955).
257. E.g., In re Bailey, 176 F. 990 (D. Utah 1910); Sims v. McFadden, 217 Ark. 810, 233
S.W.2d 375 (1950); Nolan v. Nolan, 155 Cal. 476, 101 P. 520 (1909); People's Bank v. O'Shields,
167 S.C. 296, 166 S.E. 351 (1932); Aisenbrey v. Hensley, 70 S.D. 294, 17 N.W.2d 267 (1945);
Wileman v. Federal Farm Mortgage Corp., 169 S.W.2d 1013 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943); see S. RiF-
SENFELD, supra note 194, at 325-26.
258. Meyer v. United States, 375 U.S. 233 (1963); see First Nat'l City Bank v. Phoenix Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 364 F. Supp. 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
259. See Sowell v. Federal Res. Bank, 268 U.S. 449, 457 (1925); Vernon, supra note 256, at
179.
260. Vernon, supra note 256, at 180-81.
261. See authorities cited note 257 supra.
262. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522() (West 1979).
263. Id See SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 77; House REPORT, supra note 8, at 363.
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provisions are about the same as those under the most recent rules for
the 1898 Act.264 Unfortunately, they do not go as far as the Commis-
sion's recommended provision that "the exemptions shall not be denied
because of a failure to claim them. '265 Presumably, the Commission
would have had the exempt property set aside to the nonclaiming
debtor by the court or an administrator.266 The Commission must have
been aware that some bankrupts had lost their exemptions by a failure
to claim them2 67 or by a failure to comply with technical bankruptcy
procedures. 268 No reasons for abandoning the sensible recommenda-
tion of the Commission are offered in the legislative history.
Under the new Act, debtors who elect exemptions under state law
will continue to be plagued by state law procedures that require decla-
rations of exemptions.269 Failure to comply with these procedures may
result in the loss of exemption rights.2 7 °
Because the new Act gives debtors a choice of exemption schemes,
debtors might elect one scheme believing that it maximizes the property
that they may retain. If the selection of property within one of these
schemes is successfully challenged and it then appears that the other
exemption scheme would be more beneficial, Congress planned that
the bankruptcy rules would accommodate the debtor and allow for a
change of exemption schemes.27'
III. CRITICISMS OF THE NEW ACT'S EXEMPTION LAW
The preceding sections contain criticisms of some of the minor and
technical provisions of the new Act. This section focuses on some of
the broader policy issues raised by the new Act and some of the issues
that were not, but should have been, addressed by Congress.
264. FED. BANKR. R. 403(0.
265. See H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 4-5030) (1975), reprinted in House Hearings, supra
note 9, app. I, at 151.
266. Id; CoMMIssION REPORT, supra note 8, pt. I at 170.
267. See D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 10, at 83.
268. See In re VanAllsberg, 14 F.2d 672 (W.D. Mich. 1926).
269. See, e.g., Finn v. Gilbert, 307 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1962); Pekola v. Strand, 25 Wash. 2d 98,
168 P.2d 407 (1946).
270. White v. Stump, 266 U.S. 310 (1924); see Myers v. Matley, 318 U.S. 622 (1943); Schultz v.
Mastrangelo, 333 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1964).
271. "The [Bankruptcy] Rules [of Procedure] will provide for the situation where the debtor's
choice of exemption, Federal or State, was improvident and should be changed, for example,
where the court has ruled against the debtor with respect to a major exemption." HoUSE REIORT,
supra note 8, at 360.
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A. Congressional Policy of "Fresh Start" Frustrated by New Act's
Exemption Provision
The use of state and federal nonbankruptcy laws to determine
debtors' exemption rights undermines "the Congressional policy of a
fresh start for a debtor." '272 This fresh start objective is basic to the
bankruptcy law of the United States and is dependent upon two key
federal policies:273 the discharge policy274 and the exemption policy.
To ensure the effectiveness of federal discharges, Congress has meticu-
lously circumscribed state laws and actions that might dilute the dis-
charge policy.275 In other words, not only has Congress itself carefully
established the discharge policy as a federal policy, it has prevented the
states from interfering with it.
Contrariwise and inexplicably, the Act's exemption provision al-
lows the states to regulate the exemption policy completely. Consider-
ing the tremendous variances in the state exemption laws, there is not
an exemption policy, but rather numerous, significantly different ex-
emption policies incorporated into the new Act. Because of the signifi-
cant variances in the exemption policies, Congress-has utterly failed to
effectuate any "Congressional policy of a fresh start for a debtor."2 6
Moreover, these variances are "contrary to a general bankruptcy policy
to have a uniform law."277
For debtors in states that have both laws that deny the alternative
bankruptcy exemption scheme to their residents as well as laws that
provide niggardly exemptions, the "fresh start" concept borders on the
meaningless.278 On the other hand, for debtors in the many states with
272. See House REPORT, supra note 8, at 366; SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 81.
273. "The two most important aspects of the fresh start available under the Bankruptcy laws
are the provision of adequate property for a return to normal life, and the discharge, with the
release from creditor collection attempts." House REPORT, supra note 8, at 125 (emphasis added).
See also id. at 176 ("The exemption section will permit an individual debtor to take out of the
estate that property that is necessary for a fresh start .... "); SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 76
("Subsection (e) protects the debtor's exemptions, his discharge, and thus his fresh start by permit-
ting him to avoid certain liens on exempt property."); CoMMIssION REPORT, supra note 8, at 169.
274. See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 523-525 (West 1979).
275. See id. §§ 524, 525; House REPORT, supra note 8, at 128, 165, 365-67, 445; SENATE RE-
PORT, supra note 8, at 80-81.
276. HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 366; SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 81 (emphasis
added).
277. House REPORT, supra note 8, at 188.
278. "Most [state exemption laws] are outmoded, designed for more rural times, and hope-
lessly inadequate to serve the needs of and provide a fresh start for modem urban debtors."
House REPORT, supra note 8, at 126.
Professor Lacy recommends the enactment of legislation that would deny residents of South
Carolina the exemptions in § 522(d), Lacy, South Carolina's Statutory Exemptions in Consumer
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very liberal exemptions, a "head start" rather than a "fresh start" will
be the policy. Ironically, this latter result is one that the Senate-the
stronger proponent of "state rights" on the exemption issue279 -eX-
pressly sought to avoid.280
As discussed elsewhere,28' a number of cogent reasons make incor-
poration of state exemption laws into a federal bankruptcy scheme in-
appropriate. Besides undermining the achievement of the bankruptcy
goal of a "fresh start," state exemptions are designed to deal with situa-
tions that differ significantly from bankruptcy. First, nonbankruptcy
exemption laws apply to debtors and against creditors during the credi-
tors' continuing collection efforts. Bankruptcy, on the other hand, en-
sures debtors creditor-free futures. Consequently, it may be wise to
give greater or different protection to debtors who are both supporting
families and attempting to reduce their debts than to persons who are
debt free. Second, state and federal nonbankruptcy exemption laws are
in part designed to prevent bankruptcy. The prevention of bankruptcy
is expressly a goal of the federal restriction on garnishment 282 and an
effect or goal of state laws.283 But clearly this goal is inapposite to any
exemption law in bankruptcy. Third, unlike state collection laws, bank-
ruptcy causes the liquidation of a debtor's estate.284 This allows for the
entire estate to be considered when exemptions are being decided.
State exemptions cannot do this because they must be concerned with
the individual pieces of property that creditors are attempting to levy
Bankruptcy, 30 S.C.L. REv. 643, 689 (1979), notwithstanding his observation that South Caro-
lina's exemptions "are antiquated and inadequate to provide even minimal protection to the mod-
em consumer." Id. at 688.
279. See 124 CONG. REC. S 17406 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978), quoted at text accompanying note
287 infra.
280. "The committee feels that the policy of the bankruptcy law is to provide a fresh start, but
not instant affluence, as would be possible under the [exemption] provisions of H.R. 8200." SEN-
ATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 6; see 124 CoNG. REc. S14721-22 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1978) (remarks
of Sen. Thurmond); see also id. S 17412 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini).
281. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 170-73; D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note
10, at 81-84; Vukowich, supra note 18, at 1441-46.
282. See 15 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(1)-(3), (b) (1976); H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 7,
20-21 (1968), reprintedin [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1962, 1962-63, 1978-79; see also
Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650-51 (1974).
283. See Vukowich, supra note 90, at 786-87, 867; f Martin v. Buswell, 108 Me. 263, 264, 80
A. 828, 829 (1911) (purpose of state exemption of farming tools is to enable farmer to support
himself and his family); Denzer v. Prendergast, 267 Minn. 212, 216, 218, 126 N.W.2d 440,443, 444
(1964) (purpose of state homestead exemption is to give debtor a stable place of abode); Cleveland
Arcade Co. v. Talcott, 22 Ohio App. 516, 517, 154 N.E. 62, 63 (1926) (purpose of state exemption
of tools and implements necessary for carrying on business, trade or profession is to protect
debtor's means of supporting himself and his family).
284. See Countryman, supra note 22, at 681.
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upon and sell. In sum, incorporation of the manifold state exemption
laws not only defeats a fundamental federal policy objective, it results
in the employment of tools that were not designed for the task at hand.
The House provision would have given debtors a choice between
the bankruptcy exemption and state and other federal exemptions.
This, the House Report reasons, "continues to recognize the States' in-
terest in regulating credit within the states, but enunciates a bankruptcy
policy favoring a fresh start." '285 The House Report seems to concede
that inclusion of the various state exemption laws as an alternative to
the bankruptcy exemptions undermines the fresh start policy; their pro-
vision merely "enunciates" a fresh start policy but falls short of estab-
lishing it. Additionally, the recognition of states' interests in regulating
credit is a questionable justification for the House provision. First,
outside the area of usury, credit regulation is increasingly becoming a
matter of federal law. 86 Second, and more importantly, the states' in-
terest in the regulation of credit is subordinate, if not irrelevant, to the
bankruptcy law's policies.
The final compromise struck by the House and Senate makes even
less sense than the original House provision. But then compromises
often lead to capricious concoctions. The compromise was described
and defended by Senator Wallop on the Senate floor:
In the area of exemptions, we [the Senate] have won an impor-
tant victory for the rights of States to determine exemptions for the
debtors of their States[.] Reduced Federal exemptions will be pro-
vided by the law but States by legislation may elect not to have them
apply [to] their debtors. This option is most important since many
States, such as my own, Wyoming, have been responsive to the needs
of debtors and have liberalized exemptions frequently in recent
years. 287
In making this statement, the Senator must have been confused, and he
most certainly was oblivious to the role of the federal exemption provi-
sion. If the Senator's concern was to ensure that debtors have modern,
liberal exemptions, the compromise is a rather poor vehicle for accom-
plishing that goal. Under the compromise, debtors from states that
deny the federal exemption in bankruptcy and have niggardly, out-of-
date exemptions will suffer. Moreover, the Senator offers no reasons
for giving the states the right to determine exemptions. This "victory
285. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 126.
286. See, e.g., Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r (West 1974 & Supp.
1979); 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-896 (1976)); FTC Holder-in-due-Course Regs., 16 C.F.R., pt. 433 (1979).
287. 124 CONG. REc. S17406 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
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for the rights of States," therefore, was won only at the expense of a
"Congressional policy of a fresh start for a debtor."2
88
In addition to the unwise incorporation of state exemption laws,
the practical exemption of interests in spendthrift trusts and the express
exemption of tenancies by the entirety, to the extent state laws protect
these property rights from creditors, are major deficiencies of the new
Act.28 9 They allow some debtors to retain "very substantial amounts of
property"2 9 while further undermining the concept of a congressional
policy of a fresh start. Moreover, these property interests have been
justifiably discredited by eminent authorities over the years.29' Finally,
Congress' incorporation of state exemption laws is at least tenuously
justified on the ground that state legislatures have presumably weighed
what property debtors should be allowed to retain. Protection of tenan-
cies by the entirety and spendthrift trusts, however, evolved from prop-
erty law principles and is not part of a thoughtful legislative debtor
exemption scheme.2
92
B. Clash of State and Federal Provisions on Exceptions and Waivers
The bankruptcy exemption provisions that recognize certain
claims as enforceable against exempt property293 and the provisions
that invalidate waivers of exemptions and certain liens on exempt
property294 raise problems that the Act does not resolve. The problems
arise if a debtor has elected or is required to take state and federal
nonbankruptcy exemptions. Because the Senate bill contained provi-
288. SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 81; see id. at 6, 76.
289. See text accompanying notes 71-75 & 194-220, supra.
290. SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 6.
291. "Much valid criticism has been leveled against the estate by the entirety. It is an anach-
ronism. . . .It affords too great an opportunity to frustrate the rights of... creditors.... The
social undesirability of the consequences attendant upon the estate by the entirety are readily
apparent." 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.6, at 32 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952); see E. GRISWOLD,
SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS §§ 105-06 (2d ed. 1947); J. GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF
PROPERTY Vi-Xi (2d ed. 1895); Plumb, supra note 23 at 95-96, 136-37.
292. In some states debtors' interests in trusts are specifically exempted by legislation. See
N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 5205(c)(d)(l) (McKinney 1963); In re Dollard, 275 F. Supp. 1001 (C.D.
Cal. 1967) (N.Y. law). In addition, although no evidence has been found to support it, there exists
the possibility that some state legislatures have relied upon the existence of tenancies by the en-
tirety as a reason for not creating a homestead exemption or, if they already have one, for not
increasing its amount. The reason that such a possibility is doubtful is that tenancy by the entirety
is not exempt when a creditor has a claim against both husband and wife; such a creditor could
not enforce his claim against homestead property unless the spouses also both gave a waiver of
their homestead rights. See Gilmer v. Freeman, 336 So. 2d 717 (Miss. 1976); Norman v. First
Bank & Trust, 557 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); Vukowich, supra note 90, at 848.49.
293. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(c) (West 1979); see text accompanying notes 233-35 supra.
294. I1 U.S.C.A. § 522(f) (West 1979); see text accompanying notes 205-29 supra.
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sions similar to these three exception and waiver provisions295 while
limiting debtors to state and federal nonbankruptcy exemptions, it is
clear that Congress intended these provisions to apply even when
nonbankruptcy exemptions were used by the debtor.2 96 In addition to
the federal provisions regarding exceptions to exemptions and waivers
of and liens on exempt property, however, state laws contain their own
lists of debts that are exceptions to exemptions as well as provisions
regarding waivers of and liens on exempt property. When these state
laws differ from the federal law, which should prevail?
This problem arises because the provisions in the federal law were
recommended by the Commission in the context of a single, federal
exemption scheme.297 When the House made the state and federal
nonbankruptcy exemptions an alternative to a federal bankruptcy ex-
emption2 98 and the Senate made state and federal nonbankruptcy laws
the sole source of exemptions,29 9 they, nevertheless, retained the Com-
mission's general proposals on these other matters.3"
1. Exceptions
The federal exemption law allows nondischargeable tax and fam-
ily support claims 30 1 as well as nonvoidable liens30 2 to be enforced
against exempt property. State laws generally, although not always,30 3
recognize these exceptions 3° and usually have additional ones. The
most common additional exceptions are debts owed laborers, 305 debts
295. S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 522(c), (d), (e) (1977), reprinted in 14 BANKRUPTCY RE-
FORM ACT OF 1978: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 97 (A. Resnick & E. Wypyski 1979); see SENATE
REPORT, supra note 8, at 76.
296. See also note 204 supra.
297. See H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-503 (1975); reprinted in House Hearings supra note
10, app. I, at 146-51; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 170-73.
298. See H.R. 8200, 95th CONG., 1st Sess. § 522(b) (1977), reprinted in 12 BANKRUPTCY RE-
FORM ACT OF 1978: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 394-95 (A. Resnick & E. Wypyski 1979).
299. See S. 2266, 95th CONG., 2d Sess. § 522(b) (1977), reprinted in 14 BANKRUPTCY REFORM
ACT OF 1978: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 97 (A. Resnick & E. Wypyski 1979).
300. Id. § 522(d), (e); H.R. 8200, 95th CONG., 1st Sess. § 522(e), (f) (1977), reprinted in 12
BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 399-400 (A. Resnick & E. Wypy-
ski 1979).
301. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(c)(1) (West 1979).
302. Id. § 522(c)(2).
303. See Vukowich, supra note 90, at 853, 860.
304. Id. at 853-54, 859-60.
305. E.g., ALA. CONST. art. 10, § 207; CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 723.051 (vest Supp. 1980);
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 5205(a) (McKinney 1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1311.34 (Page Supp.
1980); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8123(b)(4) (Purdon Supp. 1979) (judgments over $100); Tax.
REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. § 3839(3) (Vernon 1966); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2740 (1973); see United
States v. Hershberger, 475 F.2d 677, 681 (10th Cir. 1973); Miles Homes, Inc. v. Muhs, 184 Neb.
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for necessaries, 30 6 and tort liabilities. 307  May creditors with these
state-excepted claims enforce them in bankruptcy against the assets ex-
empted by state law? To answer affirmatively is to expand upon the
exceptions that Congress resolutely included in the Act. Indeed, an af-
firmative answer might find a clear contravention of congressional in-
tent in the context of tax claims. Many state laws create exceptions for
all state and federal tax claims without regard to the nature of the
tax.308  Congress, however, pointedly narrowed the bankruptcy law's
exception to nondischargeable309 tax claims.3
On the other hand, to answer negatively is to frustrate the exemp-
tion schemes developed by state legislatures. They might not have
given certain or such large exemptions without the exceptions.
Although it is unlikely that Congress actually considered this
problem, the better resolution of it would be to allow only those excep-
tions provided in the bankruptcy law to be enforced against exempt
property. Congress appears to have singled out certain exceptions to
the exclusion of others. The incidental frustration of state exemption
schemes is less damaging than a failure to follow a congressional direc-
tive.31'
617, 619, 169 N.W.2d 691, 692 (1969); Brookline Sav. & Trust Co. v. Barnett, 243 S.C. 481, 134
S.E.2d 569 (1964).
306. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.20.405(c) (1979) (unemployment compensation); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 10-8-114 (1973); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.6023-(a)(6) (1977) (life and health insurance);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1557 (1975) (property valued over $500); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 30.30.120 (1961) (trust income or vested remainder); see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 723.051 (West
Supp. 1979) (income necessary to support family).
307. ALA. CONsT. art. 10, § 204; ALA. CODE § 6-10-6 (1975), construed in Brown Shoe Co. v.
Schaefer, 242 Ala. 310, 314, 6 So. 2d 405, 408 (1942); ARK. CONsT. art. 9, §§ 1-3, construedin Hill
v. Bush, 192 Ark. 181, 187-88, 90 S.W.2d 490, 494 (1936).
308. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 52, § 3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 513.465
(Vernon 1952); N.C. CONsT. art. X, § 2(1); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 812.18(2)(b)(3) (1977).
309. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(1) (West 1979).
310. The Senate's bill would have created an exception for all tax claims, whether or not
dischargeable. See S. 2266, 95th CONG., 2d Sess. § 522(c)(3) (1977) reprintedin 14 BANKRUPTCY
REFORM ACT OF 1978: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 98 (A. Resnick & E. Wypyski 1979). In negotia-
tions with members of the House, this point was conceded, and the new Act's exception is limited
to nondischargeable tax claims. See 124 CoNo. REC. S17412, S17430 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978)
(remarks of Sen. DeConcini); id. HI 1113 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards).
311. Another problem raised by the differences in the state law and bankruptcy law exceptions
is less troublesome. If state law does not except one of the claims or liens that Congress has
excepted, the congressional exception should be recognized. Congress appears to have resolved
that the interests of creditors with nondischargeable tax claims, family support claims, and non-
avoidable liens outweigh debtor's interests in exempt property. Although I have criticized this
judgment, see text accompanying notes 246-48 supra, the intent seems to be clear.
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2. Waiver and Security Interests
Analogous problems arise with waivers of exemptions and non-
purchase money security interests in exempt property. These two de-
vices for defeating debtors' exemption rights are generally more
circumscribed by the Bankruptcy Act's exemption provisions than by
state laws. The congressional intent seems clear that these devices
should be unenforceable in bankruptcy if they fall within the Bank-
312 ~ sae1ruptcy Act's proscription, even if state law would have enforced the
waiver or security interest.
If, on the other hand, a waiver or security interest is enforceable
under the bankruptcy exemption law but unenforceable under state
law,313 the state law should be deferred to and the waiver or security
interest held unenforceable. Unlike the comparable issue in the context
of exceptions to exemptions, 1 4 there is no congressional intent to favor
creditors who have received waivers or security interests in contraven-
tion of state law. On the contrary, Congress went further than most
states in protecting debtors' exemptions. Its intent was expansive to the
end that the goals of the exemption laws-either state or federal bank-
ruptcy-not be frustrated. 1 5 Moreover, because such a waiver or secur-
ity interest in unenforceable under state law, the debtor's trustee should
be able to avoid it.3" 6 Because the property is exempt and the trustee
might not seek to assert this right, however, the debtor should be al-
lowed to do so.3" 7 It would be unjust to allow creditors to enforce
312. See HousE REPORT, supra note 8, at 362; SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 76.
313. Because bankruptcy law protections are generally broader than state law protections, this
would be a relatively rare occurrence. However, with state legislatures taking a more active role in
the area of debtor protection, it might develop into a more serious problem in the future. Cur-
rently, it might arise because a few state laws do give greater protection than bankruptcy law. See
UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §§ 2.307(1) (security interest in land unenforceable in super-
vised loans under $1,000; bankruptcy law would allow this); § 3.301-302 (no nonpurchase money
security interest in goods) (1974). Another situation that might arise involves the homestead.
Under the bankruptcy law, a mortgage of the homestead by the debtor-owner would be enforce-
able. See text accompanying notes 212-215 supra. Some state laws, however, require that the
nonowner-spouse join in the execution of the mortgage. Eg., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 52, § 4 (Smith-
Hurd Cum. Supp. 1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 513.475.2 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1979); see Marr v.
Bradley, 239 Minn. 503, 59 N.W.2d 331 (1953); Gilmer v. Freeman, 336 So. 2d 717 (Miss. 1976);
Miles Homes, Inc. v. Muhs, 184 Neb. 617, 169 N.W.2d 691 (1969); Grenard v. McMahan, 441 P.2d
950 (Okla. 1968); Norman v. First Bank & Trust, 557 S.W.2d 797 (rex. Civ. App. 1977). Conse-
quently, a mortgage given only by the owner-spouse would be invalid in such states although
valid under bankruptcy law.
314. See note 311 supra.
315. See HousE REPORT, supra note 8, at 126, 362.
316. 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(e) (West 1979).
317. The bankruptcy exemption provision does allow the debtor to avoid certain transfers
regarding exempt property based upon the trustee's avoiding powers. See id. § 522(h). These are
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waivers or security interests that they could not have enforced had
bankruptcy not intervened.
C Possible Double Exemption Regarding Nondischarged Debts
A debtor who elects the exemptions given in subsection 522(d) of
the new Act may enjoy double exemptions regarding nondischarged
debts, other than tax and family support claims. The Act extends the
protection of its exemptions to "after the case" for debts that arose
before the commencement of the case.318 Consequently, after bank-
ruptcy, a creditor with a nondischarged debt may be faced with two
separate sets of exemptions: those under subsection 522(d) and those
the debtor enjoys under state law. Because nondischargeable claims
should, if anything, be favored,3 19 this result is incongruous. Congress
no doubt extended the protection of its exemptions to after the case
because without such an extension creditors could enforce nondis-
charged claims against property that the Act exempted but that state
law did not exempt.321 In fairness to creditors and debtors alike, credi-
tors with nondischarged claims should be allowed to enforce their
claims subject only to the Act's exemptions; state exemptions should
not apply. The federal interest in these cases seems strong since it is the
bankruptcy law that determines that these creditors' claims are nondis-
chargeable and, by hypothesis, the debtors have elected the federal
bankruptcy exemption scheme.
D. Creation of Exemptions on Eve of Bankruptcy
A great deal of concern has been voiced about debtors who maxi-
mize their exemptions by using nonexempt assets to purchase or im-
prove exempt property immediately before bankruptcy.321 Although
one study found "no such activity," '322 the practice, guided by debtors'
attorneys, is widespread in certain parts of the country. 23 Careful ex-
inapposite, however, to the situation being discussed because either a waiver or a security interest
will have been a "voluntary transfer" by the debtor. See id. §§ 522(g)(1), (h).
318. Id. § 522(c).
319. See, e.g., COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 78.
320. See Vukowich, supra note 18, at 1451-53.
321. Eg., Davis, Letting,4ffectedParties Communicate Standards-Exempt Property, 53 IOWA
L. REV. 366, 383-88 (1967); Glenn, Property Exemptfrom Creditors' Rights of Realization, 26 VA.
L. REv. 127, 141-42 (1939); Kennedy, supra note 23, at 476; see Resnick, Prudent Planning or
Fraudulent Transfer? The Use of Nonexempt Assets to Purchase or Improve Exempt Property on the
Eve of Bankruptcy, 31 RUTGERS L. REv. 615, 648-49 n.201 (1978).
322. House Hearings, supra note 9, at 771-72 (statement of Professor Shuchman).
323. Id. 1350-51, 1355-58; see In reWudrick, 305 F. Supp. 1123, 1125 (C.D. Cal. 1969), a'din
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emption planning can undoubtedly be effective in the case of some
debtors. With the new Act's right to elect between state and federal
exemptions, attorneys will likely become more aware of the prospect of
creating exemptions on the eve of bankruptcy; because they will be
comparing their clients' fates under the state and federal alternatives,
changes in the property owned by debtors will more readily be sug-
gested. Under state law324 and the 1898 Bankruptcy Act,325 the acquisi-
tion of exempt assets with nonexempt assets is generally permissible. If
the nonexempt assets were themselves acquired fraudulently, however,
both state" 6 and federal courts321deny the exemption.
The new Act does not directly address the issue. It was raised at
hearings328 and discussed in one of the original bankruptcy reform bills
before Congress.329 The Commission's proposal did not contain a spe-
cific statutory recommendation regarding the issue, but a note accom-
panying its recommended statute stated, "The exemption is available as
to the property specified regardless of when acquired or the source of
the consideration paid for the property claimed."33 This statement is
broader than the case law and is unjust to the extent that it allows an
exemption in property that was acquired fraudulently.
Congress evidently intended that the judicially developed rules on
this issue should be carried over under the new Act. The House33 and
Senate332 reports state: "As under current law, the debtor will be permit-
ted to convert nonexempt property into exempt property before filing a
bankruptcy petition. The practice is not fraudulent as to creditors, and
part, rey'd inpart sub nom. Wudrick v. Clements, 451 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1971); Karol, Effective
Insolvency Planningfor the Consumer Bankrupt in California, 52 L.A.B.J. 376 (1977).
324. E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Pope, 274 Ala. 395, 404-05, 149 So. 2d 781, 790-91 (1963); Metz
v. Williams, 149 Kan. 647, 650-51, 88 P. 1093, 1095 (1939); Hunter v. Griffith, 12 Okla. 436, 440-
49, 72 P. 361, 362-65 (1903).
325. E.g, Wudrick v. Clements, 451 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1971); Love v. Menick, 341 F.2d 680
(9th Cir. 1965); In re Dudley, 72 F. Supp. 942 (D. Cal. 1947), af'dper cur/am sub non. Goggin v.
Dudley, 166 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir. 1948).
326. See Schoenfeld v. Norberg, 267 Cal. App. 2d 496, 498, 72 Cal. Rptr. 924, 926 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1968); Metz v. Williams, 149 Kan. 647, 649-51, 88 P.2d 1093, 1094-95 (1939); Baucum v.
Texam Oil. Corp., 423 S.W.2d 434, 442 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967); Tabish v. Smith, 572 P.2d 378
(Utah 1977); Webster v. Rodrick, 64 Wash. 2d 814, 818-19, 394 P.2d 689, 692 (1964).
327. See In re White, 221 F. Supp. 64 (N.D. Cal. 1963). Cf. Miguel v. Walsh, 447 F.2d 724
(9th Cir. 1971) (nonexempt assets fraudulently converted); Mott v. Groves, 428 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir.
1970) (same); Kangas v. Robie, 264 F.2d 92 (8th Cir. 1920) (same).
328. See House Hearings, supra note 9, at 1350-58.
329. See H.R. 32, 94th CONG., 1st Sess. § 4-503(f) (1975), reprinted in House Hearings, supra
note 9, app. I, at 148 (bill proposed by bankruptcy judges).
330. CoMMissIoN REPORT, supra note 8, pt. II, at § 4-128 n.2 (proposed § 4-503).
331. HousE REPORT, supra note 8, at 361 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
332. SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 76 (emphasis added).
1980]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [
permits the debtor to make full use of the exemptions to which he is
entitled under the law." This statement seems to presuppose that the
debtor has not defrauded creditors in order to acquire the nonexempt
assets that are converted into exempt assets; so interpreted, it is consis-
tent with "current law. '333
E Needfor Explanation of Terms
Two phrases in the new Act's exemption provision are undefined
and consequently likely to raise problems. On five occasions the Act
limits exemptions by the phrase "to the extent reasonably necessary for
the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor. '334 The
items so limited are rights to family support,3 " payments under pen-
sion and related plans, 336 wrongful death payments, 337 life insurance
death benefits, 338and compensation for loss of future earnings. 339 Un-
fortunately, neither the Act nor its legislative history clarify the mean-
ing of this crucial phrase. A similar concept is used in many state
exemption laws and has had a varied interpretation.340
California courts have construed the "reasonably necessary" stan-
dard subjectively, in terms of the debtor's customary standard of living
and social class."41 Although this view has received support from a few
commentators, 34 2 it should be rejected in favor of a standard that does
not discriminate based upon debtors' socio-economic classes. A fairer
interpretation would hold that the phrase means "reasonably needed
by an average and reasonable person and his or her dependents. 343
This objective standard finds support in the Senate's position that the
exemption law "provide a fresh start, but not instant affluence."
344
Furthermore, application of the "reasonably necessary" standard
should take into account all the exempt assets owned by the debtor, as
333. See notes 324-27 and accompanying text supra.
334. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(10)(D)-(E), (I I)(B)-(C), (E) (West 1979).
335. Id. § 522(d)(10)(D).
336. Id. § 522(d)(10)(E).
337. Id. § 522(d)(I 1)(B).
338. Id. § 522(d)(11)(C).
339. Id. § 522(d)(1 1)(E).
340. See general, Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 607 (1972).
341. Newport Nat'l Bank v. Adair, 2 Cal. App. 3d 1043, 1046, 83 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1969); Inde-
pendence Bank v. Heller, 275 Cal. App. 2d 84, 87-88, 90, 79 Cal. Rptr. 868, 871, 872 (1969).
342. E.g., D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 10, at 206.
343. See Vukowich, supra note 90, at 847-48.
344. SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 6.
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well as future income, rather than consider each asset in isolation. 45
Another troublesome phrase is found in the exemption of certain
forms of compensation under subsection 522(d)(1 1).346 Here the trouble
lies in the extension of the exemption to "property that is traceable to"
the monies paid as compensation. 47 In the past, courts have struggled
with the "tracing" aspect of state and federal exemption laws. 48 Con-
flicting decisions have been common.349 The bankruptcy statute obvi-
ates one problem--determining whether tracing should be allowed at
all. The drafting technique employed unambiguously indicates that
tracing should be allowed for the kinds of compensation listed in the
subsection; by implication,350 tracing should not be allowed for the
other exemptions.
Though tracing is definitely required, a major problem nonetheless
remains: how do the courts know when property is "traceable to" the
exempt types of compensation? If exempt compensation is received by
a debtor, does the exemption continue to protect securities and paint-
ings that were purchased with the exempt compensation, or a trust fund
that was established with the exempt compensation?
Supreme Court precedent concerning veterans' disability compen-
sation payments35 ' and disability insurance benefits under the Social
Security Act352 has extended a similar exemption to protect these bene-
fits while on deposit in savings and bank accounts. The Court seems to
have established a standard that requires that the compensation be held
by the debtor in such a way that it is "readily available as needed for
support and maintenance," retaining the "qualities of moneys. 353 The
cases imply that the exemption would be lost if the compensation was
345. See UNIFORM EXEMPTION AcT § 6(b); IDAHO CODE § 11-604(2) (1979).
346. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(11) (West 1979).
347. 1d. (emphasis added).
348. See generally Dunham, supra note 158.
349. Compare, e.g., Pease v. North Am. Fin. Corp., 244 N.W.2d 400 (Mich. App. 1976)
(AFDC payments deposited in account exempt), and Goodyear Serv. Store v. Speck, 48 Ohio
App. 2d 115, 355 N.E.2d 886 (1976) (same), with Holmes v. Blazer Fin. Serv., Inc., 369 So. 2d 987
(Fla. App. 1979) (wages deposited in checking account lose exempt status); McCabe v. Fee, 568
P.2d 661 (Or. 1977) (workmen's compensation loses exempt status once deposited in account), and
John 0. Melby & Co. Bank v. Anderson, 276 N.W.2d 274 (Wis. 1979) (wages not protected by title
III of Consumer Credit Protection Act once deposited in account).
350. See, e.g., Glickstein v. U.S., 222 U.S. 139 (1911).
351. See Porter v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 370 U.S. 159 (1962).
352. Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413 (1973).
353. Porter v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 370 U.S. 159, 162 (1962); see Philpott v. Essex County
Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413, 416 (1973).
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"converted into permanent investments. 354 These Supreme Court de-
cisions are in accord with the legislative intent since the compensation
in those cases was in the form of support payments; once the compensa-
tion lost its support characteristic, as by permanent investment, the ex-
emption terminated.
The precedent might not apply to the bankruptcy exemption in all
instances, however, since some of the compensation in the bankruptcy
exemption differs significantly from the support payments considered
in those cases. For example, the exemptions for payments "on account
of the wrongful death of an individual of whom the debtor was a de-
pendent'355 and payments "under a life insurance contract that insured
the life of an individual of whom the debtor was a dependent" '356 seem
to contemplate the possibility that these payments will not be used
solely to supply present support, but also to ensure support in the fu-
ture. In other words, Congress's intent with respect to some of the
"traceable to" assets seems to be to exempt investment assets that will
be used as sources of debtors' future support. Consequently, if a debtor
can show that investment assets are traceable to exempt compensation
and are necessary for support, the assets should be exempted.357 Not
only does this comport with the congressional intention, it makes good
financial sense. Allowing dependents to use the proceeds of life insur-
ance or a wrongful death settlement to establish a trust fund or invest
in securities might generate more support than if held in a savings or
bank account.
. Application of the Dollar Limitations
The new Act does not specify what should be done if an item of
exempt property exceeds the dollar value limitation. For example, if a
debtor owns an automobile with a fair market value3 58 of $3,000 and
has exhausted his $7,900 "any property" exemption,359 the automobile
cannot be claimed as exempt because its value exceeds the $1,200 limi-
tation.36° Upon sale, does the estate retain the full $3,000, or does the
debtor receive $1,200, leaving the estate with only $1,800? A few states
354. Id.; Dunham, supra note 158, at 324-25.
355. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(l 1)(B) (West 1979).
356. Id. § 522(d)(1 1)(C).
357. Cf Dunham, supra note 158, at 343-44 (suggesting that what is necessary for support will
require some fine line drawing).
358. See text accompanying notes 76, 77 & 86-88 supra.
359. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(1), (5) (West 1979); see text accompanying notes 98-100 supra.
360. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(2) (West 1979).
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have statutes that clearly indicate that the debtor is entitled to receive
cash in the amount of the exemption limitation.361 Absent such a stat-
ute, bankruptcy 362 and state363 courts have split on the issue.
The appropriate resolution under the new Act is not free from
doubt. The legislative history omits any direct reference to this prob-
lem.364 The most reasonable resolution is to allow the debtor to retain
from the proceeds of the sale an amount equal to the dollar value limi-
tation.3 65 This is fair to creditors and consistent with Congress's policy
in granting the exemption. It is fair to creditors since they would re-
ceive nothing from the exempt item if its actual value equalled or was
less than the dollar value limitation; their interest thus corresponds to
the surplus over the dollar value limitation. For example, a $1,200
used automobile would be completely exempt.366 To deny totally the
exemption if a used automobile has a value of $1,250 would give credi-
tors a windfall of $1,200.
Allowing debtors to retain cash in the amount of the dollar value
limitation is consistent with Congress's policy of allowing debtors to
retain the type of property listed in subsection 522(d) so long as the
value is modest. If a debtor owns an item that exceeds the statutory
limit, allowing him cash in the statutory amount will allow him to
purchase a less expensive substitute. The congressional goal of debtor
protection within reasonable limits will thus be realized.367
361. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-10-38(b) (1975) (homestead); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-55-
109 (1973) (personalty); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 52, § 8 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1979) (homestead);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.6033 (Callaghan 1977) (any exempt property); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 550.41 (West 1947) (personalty); OR. REv. STAT. § 23.160(2) (1977) (personalty).
362. Compare Levin v. Mauro, 425 F. Supp. 205 (D. Mass. 1977), with In re Fox, 16 F. Supp.
320 (S.D. Cal. 1936).
363. Compare Gutterman v. First Nat'l Bank, 597 P.2d 969 (Alaska 1979), and Maschke v.
O'Brien, 142 Pa. Super. 559, 17 A.2d 923 (1941), with Perkins v. McGonagle, 342 A.2d 187 (Me.
1975).
364. A reference in the House Report to the Uniform Exemptions Act might indicate the
House's intention to incorporate that Act's treatment of the problem. The Report states, "[The
Federal exemptions] are derived in large part from the Uniform Exemptions Act. HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 8 at 361. The Uniform Exemptions Act's draftsmen intended for debtors to
be given an exemption up to the dollar value limitation when property exceeds the limitation. See
UNIFORM EXEMPTIONS ACT § 8, Comment 3.
365. See Levin v. Mauro, 425 F. Supp. 205 (D. Mass. 1977); Gutterman v. First Nat'l Bank,
597 P.2d 969 (Alaska 1979); Maschke v. O'Brien, 142 Pa. Super. 559 17 A.2d 923 (1941).
366. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(2) (West 1979).
367. Another solution to the problem in some cases would be to allow the debtor to borrow the
amount of the surplus and turn that over to the estate. However, this will not always be possible.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The exemption scheme of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
leaves one with a feeling of ambivalence. Certainly there are many
meritorious aspects to the new law. Overall, the exemption scheme in
subsection 522(d) appears to be both reasonable and fair.368 The prop-
erty exempted is generally necessary for family support, and the dollar
amount limitations are modest. Certainly the treatment of life insur-
ance exemptions should be lauded. Moreover, the various provisions
designed to ensure the effectiveness of the exemptions were much
needed.
On the other hand, Congress's incorporation of state and non-
bankruptcy federal laws as an alternative or, at the states' options, the
exclusive source of exemptions is unwarranted. In those states with
parsimonious exemptions, the goals of family protection and debtor re-
habilitation cannot be efficiently realized. And in those states with very
generous exemptions, debtors are able to retain property in excess of
that needed for family protection and rehabilitation while being freed
from their debts. Congress has unfortunately and unwisely under-
mined the realization of the beneficent policy that is the cornerstone of
the American bankruptcy law-the fresh start for debtors.
This Article has pointed out some areas in which technical amend-
ments are needed. In addition to these technical problems, Congress
should reconsider some of the broader policy issues behind the bank-
ruptcy laws and improve the exemption provision to reflect a single and
uniform congressional policy regarding the property that debtors
should be allowed to retain for their fresh starts.
368. But see Vukowich, supra note 90, at 805-07.
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